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Introduction
There is no reason to believe that the foundation for liberty in cyberspace will simply
emerge. Indeed, the passion for that anarchy—as in America by the late 1890s, and as in
the former Eastern bloc by the late 1990s—has faded. Thus as, our framers learned, and
as the Russians saw, we have every reason to believe that cyberspace, left to itself, will
not fulfill the promise of freedom. Left to itself, cyber-space will become a perfect tool of
control. –Lawrence Lessig, Code 2.0 (4).
Put simply, this is a thesis about technology. Yet often technology is conceptualized as
simply machines; however, the idea of technology rooted in human practices is less appreciated
or disregarded altogether. The above quotation asserts that technology is not purely neutral.
Rather, political and social forces shape technology and how people and governments interact
with it. In this specific example, Lessig fears the unprecedented possibilities of control via the
manipulation of a powerful tool like the Internet when designed for more nefarious purposes. Yet
common experiences with information and communication technologies (ICTs) nationally and
globally exhort a more liberalizing experience that champions the unparalleled connectivity of
the Internet. The answer to whether these ICTs like the Internet, social networking sites, and cell
phones are forces of democratization largely depends on the political contexts in which they are
employed.
A definition of technology is useful before passing judgment on today’s most
sophisticated technologies. Technology is both a physical apparatus like the brain, but also a
medium, or a mind—a use to which a physical apparatus is put, according to Neil Postman.
Postman’s book Technopoly: The Surrender of Culture to Technology meditates on how
technology—something as simple as placing a quantitative value to human thoughts, like grading
a student’s paper—does not add or subtract something, “it changes everything” (Postman, 18).
Postman concludes that “technology always has unforeseen consequences, and it is not always
clear, at the beginning, who or what will win, and who or what will lose” (Postman). For
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example, Gutenberg, a stout Catholic, invented the printing press in hopes to unify the Holy
Roman Empire, but in practice it was the seed of its destruction since it facilitated the fracture of
the Church (Postman, 15). Similarly, monks invented the mechanical clock to organize prayer
time, yet its contrivance enabled the tracking of “synchronization and controlling the actions of
men,” which in turn spurred capitalism (Postman, 14). Additionally, how a technology is used by
a particular culture is not necessarily the only way it could be used (Postman lecture). Postman’s
work aims to salvage humanity from the overconsumption of technology and cautions against the
readiness of society to adopt new technologies without considering how it impacts culture. Even
though Postman was wary of this new technological society, his advice is clear: to not dissociate
technology from human processes. Although written in 1992, Postman’s ideas that caution
against technology are extremely relevant in 2015 and drive the motivation for this thesis that
seeks to assess whether ICTs impacts political power, and if so, at what costs?
Over the past year, there have been numerous examples of how technology has become
more woven into daily political processes. In Hong Kong’s Umbrella movement organizers,
known as “keyboard fighters,” used ICTs facilitated invaluable coordination and organization
logistics (Beam, 1). These civil disobedient-styled protests garnered massive attention in their
demands for “greater democracy,” which even resulted in a live-television debate between
political officials and young activists (Forsythe and Wong, 1). Additionally, ICTs like smart
phone cameras captured several instances of police brutality that ignited protests in New York,
New York and Baltimore, Maryland, leading to a public conversation about society that perhaps
would not occur otherwise. This new digital age of connectivity was initially met with optimism
that it would lead to more accountable leaders and transparent political processes. Some even
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touted the Internet as being a tool for global democratization. Yet this is only one glimpse of a
very complex picture of the ICT age.
This thesis questions the universality of ICTs as “liberation technology” and whether
information and communication technologies (ICTs) enhance the political power of citizens in
some capacities. To think more deeply about this question it helps to analyze how states react to
such technology.
Increasingly, the world becomes more digitized. In the United States, recent figures show
that smart phone ownership escalated from thirty-five percent in 2011 to sixty-four percent in
2014 (Pew Research). These statistics indicate a growing trend of how digital technologies play a
larger role in our lives, and specifically, in our minute-to-minute actions. Like Postman says,
“technologies create ways in which people perceive reality,” which has shifted to an increased
use and importance of ICTs (Postman, 21). Users receive their news and communicate with
fellow citizens at the speed of their fingertips. No longer reliant on physical constraints of time
and space, users enjoy immediate connectivity and convenience that the ICT age brings about.
Yet this growing dependence on technology affects how users interact with politics and how they
envision the future.
In the first chapter of the thesis, I survey the scholarly literature regarding whether ICTs
are forces of democratization. Those who favor the liberalizing effects of the Web are labeled as
cyber-utopians, whereas those who anticipate state control of the Internet as a means of
reinforcing their power are known as “cyber-realists.” This fissure begs the questions of whether
ICTs facilitate political power in favor of the state or its citizens and whether future revolutions
will be waged technologically. To test these competing hypotheses, I chose four case studies. My
first case study, China—the epitome of Internet suppression—boasts the world’s largest number
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of Internet-connected users on the planet. However, the China Communist Party (CCP) does not
show any signs of declining power due to the integration of ICTs. Rather, the case will be made
that the Party’s power has only grown stronger with the emergence of the Internet and the
transformation of citizens into netizens.
My second case study assesses the role technology plays in the newly formed Islamic
State of Syria and the Levant (ISIS). In the summer of 2014, ISIS captured global attention for
their expansion from cities in Syria to northern areas of Iraq, including Mosul. For the purpose of
this thesis, I analyzed their use of social media and gruesome viral videos that served various
functions, including terror, prove of statehood, and terror all as a means of legitimizing their
power. Unlike other fundamentalist groups, ISIS possesses territory and performs state-like
duties and functions. Thanks to the Internet, I was able to analyze their videos as they were
uploaded over the course of several months up until March 2015. Although ISIS may not yet
possess state capabilities regarding the power of the Web, it demonstrates a keen ability to
leverage power from ICTs that reinforces their power on the ground in the Levant.
My third case study of the 2011 Egyptian protests during the Arab Spring presents an
example of how ICTs could act as “liberation technology” by generating grassroots mobilization
that initiated a change in governance. Yet this is only partly true of what happened in Egypt from
2011 to 2013, when massive swaths of people called for President Mubarak’s resignation, which
he delivered in February 2011. Cell phones and Internet messaging networks facilitated
mobilization by catalyzing existing alternative political networks. Since then, however, Egypt
devolved into more chaos leading to the disempowerment of democratically-elected Mohammed
Morsi in favor of “temporary” military order. Again, the analysis aims to assess the extent of the
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role played by ICTs—if technology was liberating—in these uprisings, and also how the state
and military benefit from controlling the networks in which the ICTs operate.
In my last case study, I analyze how both grassroots movements and the government use
ICTs respectively. First, I focus on instances of digital mobilization in the United States with the
2011 Occupy movement and the impact of the cyber-vigilante group, Anonymous. Similar to the
ICT-fueled organization noted in Tahrir Square, the Occupy movement spread across the U.S. in
the Fall 2011 and across the globe. The second part of the chapter investigates the political
efficacy of ICTs in the United States in the post-Edward Snowden era. The revelations made
over the course of the Summer 2013 exposed the U.S.’ intelligence agencies’ remarkable
capabilities in tracking, collecting, and storing data from all users’ ICTs, unknown to technology
companies and citizens.
As citizens’ lives become more digital, political processes too become digital. Citizens
gain more tools through which they can spread knowledge of their interests and political goals:
social networking and sharing videos and photos allows for an unprecedented tool of
connectivity. The power to connect is unquestioned; however, whether ICTs politically empower
the masses remains ambiguous. Grassroots movements now require digital connectivity and
thrive from making connections more easily and quickly. This power demonstrates itself in
tangible ways in the physical turnout of people at political gatherings. Yet this presentation of
grassroots power conflicts with the state’s separate use of ICTs to control data and incubate
political power.
Professor Daniel Klinghard describes technology as possessing a hidden form of control
unbeknownst to the user. Likewise, this thesis aims to explore the disguised forms of control
embedded in ICTs and how its uses vary in the four case studies. Although we remain in the
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early years of the ICT era, the disguise of control embedded within ICTs is becoming clearer.
Lessig’s fears of ICTs as unprecedented tools of control have borne fruit and merit a closer,
comparative analysis.
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Chapter 1: Literature Review
The revolution of the Internet across the globe facilitates communication and makes
information instantly available with network-connected devices. In line with a liberal democratic
viewpoint, the Internet, or simply the Web, then must contain an inherent coding for democracy
that utilizes this virtual connectedness to liberate oppressed populations. Instead of forcefully
removing tyrants from power, the masses can tweet them out of their ostentatious palaces. This
optimistic valuation of the Internet’s sheer, potential force gives birth to a controversial idea,
which Evgeny Morozov calls, cyber-utopianism: an ideology asserting that a new wave of
democratization stems not from the breaking down of walls, but from wiring authoritarian
nations with a ticking time bomb, the Internet.
The emergence of information and communication technologies (ICTs), like the Internet,
e-mail, cell phones, and social networking sites, undoubtedly changes the way people interact on
a micro-level, and accordingly, impacts how governments interact with their people and other
states. The Internet does not destroy authoritarian regimes, instead the digital civil society
created by ICTs facilitates the overthrow of tyrants in the twenty-first century. The development
of more capable internet-connected devices and technologies presumes a new level of
connectedness unprecedented in human history. Hence, the Web even earned itself a place on the
U.S. State Department’s list as a democratic right. Presidents, First Ladies, Secretaries of States,
and foreign diplomats all endorsed the Internet in global speeches as a critical component of
today’s modern democracies. In 2010, Secretary of State Hilary Clinton proclaimed, “We stand
for a single Internet where all of humanity has equal access to knowledge and ideas” (Diamond,
16). Still years later, in March 2014, First Lady Michelle Obama insinuated the importance of a
virtual civil society in China, “It is so important for information and ideas to flow freely over the
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Internet ... because that's how we discover the truth" (Times). It follows that by securing freedom
of the Web, “freedom via the Web” can then occur in authoritarian regimes. The mantra from
democratic nations like the United States champions the Internet as an inherently democratizing
force. Such cyber-utopianism runs on “a naïve belief in the emancipatory nature of online
communication” alongside a refusal to recognize that negative ICT impacts potentially burden
society (Morozov, xiii).
It is true that the Web has been and can continue to be used to create more freedoms in
several nations. The foundation of these arguments rests on a civil society created and fortified
by the Internet. We can rely on classic democratic theories that are rejuvenated or recalculated to
account for the variable of the Internet. From this civil society viewpoint, the Internet’s
democratizing force seeps into the most authoritarian regimes and breathes new political life into
these “closed-off worlds.” From the U.S’ government point of view and many pro-Internet
democratization scholars, ICTs produced a wave of optimism about the creation of freedoms in
previously impenetrable authoritarian regimes.
Scholars like Larry Diamond see the Internet as a precondition for democracy, but also
concede that the struggle for electronic access is “just the timeless struggle for freedom by new
means. It is not technology, but people, organizations, and governments that will determine who
prevails” (16). At this point, Diamond and others hope the Internet embodies democratic
qualities in its ability to build an active civil society in once unreachable, authoritarian regimes.
The traditional idea of civil society expands exponentially thanks to the Internet. The ability to
communicate and organize without typical authoritarian repercussions allows a civil society to
strengthen. Ideally, under this theory, a social movement demand more democratic rights until a
society transitions to democracy.

Kerr 10
Prior to the 2011 uprisings in North Africa and the Middle East, Philip N. Howard
published, The Digital Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Information Technology and
Political Islam, that in many ways prophesized the Arab Spring, or at the least the growing
potential for uprisings in slowly democratizing Muslim nations. Howard emphasizes the capacity
for political change embedded in the digital civil society. Building on earlier ideas of how
empowering civil society can bring about democratic change, Howard sees the Web as a new
avenue that can accelerate social and political change in authoritarian regimes once perceived as
impenetrable. Howard asserts that ICTs are broken into four categories: wired political parties, a
wired state, digital media, and a large online civil society, which facilitate the growth of these
new counter-balances to traditional authoritarian control (199). Most importantly though,
Howard finds that these ICTs erode authoritarian control and enlighten the populace since
“information and communication technologies are the infrastructure for transposing democratic
ideals from community to community” (199). In this vein, Howard lauds the Internet’s ability to
connect Muslim neighborhoods and states together and “provide new channels for mediating
political discourse” (199). Thus, ICTs promote transparency and “improve the ability of civil
society groups to monitor what their state is doing” (199).
Howard wholeheartedly believes that the Internet has reinforced civil society in the
Middle East. First, Howard defines civil society groups as a “crucial part of all democracies” that
is separate from the state (134). By developing space online for political debate uninhibited by
authoritarian regimes, ICTs act “as the infrastructure for civil society” (135). His argument
stresses how the Internet promotes “diverse new values, ideas and interests into social settings”
(142). In addition civil society provides the necessary infrastructure and organization to run a
social group, and serves a symbolic function of civil discourse absent in traditionally apolitical
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societies (142). While acknowledging extremist elements on the Web, Howard insists that, “an
active online civil society is a key ingredient of the causal recipe for democratization” (156). In
contrast to Barrington Moore’s classic work, The Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy,
Howard argues that states in the Middle East are demonstrating the digital origins of
contemporary dictatorships and democracies (200). Civil society combined with these “new
information technologies” brings about democratic transition and “solidification” (201). While
conceding that the state can use similar technologies to control information and manipulate the
public, Howards believes the public’s determination to circumvent controls ultimately triumphs:
While there certainly are examples of how states use ICTs to control information and
manipulate the public, there are far more examples of how ICTs are used by the public to
get around the informational controls set up by states. Citizens…are no longer just
consumers of political content, they manage the means of cultural production through
consumer electronics. (201)
More importantly, Howard’s argument stresses that political change is more evolutionary than
revolutionary, and that the transition to democratization is “increasingly” a digital one (201).
Howard’s 2013 book, Democracy’s Fourth Wave: Digital Media and the Arab Spring,
gives credence to his earlier ideas in which he declares that the uprisings demonstrate the
effective of information technologies as, “a tool for gradually eroding centralized state power”
(44). Again Howard’s argument emphasizes the civil society on the Web as flourishing even at
times of when the state cracks down (45). Howard pointedly illuminates his argument on page
34: “Social media have become the scaffolding upon which a functioning civil society can
grow…[new] freedoms they did not have before: information networks not easily controlled by the
state and coordination tools that are already embedded in trusted networks of family and friends.”

In his conclusion, Howard contends that countries that did not experience political uprisings
lacked “a civil society equipped with digital scaffolding” (123). Hence, his argument spans both
his books—civil society grew by producing its own content and remaining connected to
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international news while also strengthening social networks that created a strong political
solidarity. Lastly, Howard concedes that the political end results may be different and sporadic,
but the uprisings themselves were digitally initiated by a vibrant digital civil society.
Larry Diamond’s article “Liberation Technology” further develops this argument that
ICTs counteract traditional authoritarian regimes. By using the Internet as an extension of the
civil forum, ideas, commentaries and debates can enrich politically repressed populations in
authoritarian regimes. Diamond lauds social networking sites as a key weapon against the
government repression of information; he describes Twitter “as one of the most potent means for
political and social networking and the rapid dissemination of news, views, and withering satire”
(8). In unison Howard extols new media technologies, namely cell phones and the Internet, as
“affect[ing] how individuals decide to participate or not participate in democratic actions” (199).
Similarly, media pundits like Thomas Friedman celebrate how social media amplifies oppressed
voices previously unheard in traditionally closed off regimes:
The role of the Internet was overrated in Egypt and Tunisia. But it is underrated in the Gulf, where, in these
more closed societies, Facebook, Twitter and YouTube are providing vast uncontrolled spaces for men and
women to talk to each other — and back at their leaders. “I don’t read any local newspapers anymore,” a
young Saudi techie told me. “I get all my news from Twitter. So much for government-controlled
newspapers.” (Freidman, Thomas. “The Other Arab Awakening,” New York Times. 10/30/13)

Moreover, Diamond argues that there is simply too much information online on the various ICT
mediums to possibly monitor and censor it all (8). The innovation of social media technologies
directly changes the power relationship between the people and their state, thus encouraging
cyber-utopians to see the Internet as a great weapon for building a digital civil society that can
challenge authoritarian regimes.
Manuel Castells’ Networks of Outrage and Hope: Social Movements in the Internet Age
affirms the revolutionary power the Internet possesses for social movements. A veteran of the
late 1960s protest movements, Castells personally describes his renewed optimism for social
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protest facilitated by the decentralized power of the Web. Castells emphasizes how the Internet
reorders the traditional power structures in which people traditionally digested information.
Throughout history social movements challenge the status-quo power holders; however, Castells
argues that digital social networks enable “unfettered deliberation and coordination of action”
without the traditional obstacles from the government and media moguls (16). Under this new
structure, Castells hypothesizes an increase in social movements fueled by ICT coordination. He
extols multimodal, digital networks of horizontal communication as the “fastest and most
autonomous, interactive reprogrammable and self-expanding means of communication in
history” (15). Hence, Castells argues that these decentralized networks lessen the power of the
traditional power holders.
While acknowledging that the Internet is a tool, and thus, open to various utilizations,
most cyber-utopians romanticize ICTs as the new pathway to democracy in traditionally closed
authoritarian regimes.

On the other side, “cyber-realists” do not romanticize the Web, but understand the
limitations of the Internet and the ways in which oppressive regimes can manipulate
technologies. “Cyber-realists” argue that ICTs actually strengthen autocrats, who can more easily
monitor and neutralize threatening movements and dissidents. Although many scholars are
willing to concede the obvious beneficial aspects of the Web, in certain places and times the
negative impacts of the Web outweigh its potential power as a democratizing force. “Cyber
realists” emphasize the Internet as a tool—open to both good and nefarious purposes. Still
though “cyber-realists” hesitate to label the new technological medium as liberalizing. For
instance, states are empowered by the Internet’s technological advances that create an
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unprecedented ability to monitor and analyze massive amounts of data about their own citizens.
Especially in authoritarian regimes, such technologies can actually stunt democratic growth in
technologically sophisticated ways. Thus, cyber-realists see the Internet as reinforcing
authoritarian states’ power as opposed to liberalizing impact via the ICTs as posited by cyberutopians.
In The Net Delusion: The Dark Side of the Internet, Evgeny Morozov challenges the idea
that Internet favors the oppressed rather than the oppressor (xiii). Morozov cites the stalled
Iranian Green Movement in 2009 as an example of cyber-utopianism that naively
overemphasized Facebook and Twitter as the impetus for political change. Instead, the Iranian
regime shut down the Internet and even used Western technologies to imprison the initial rabblerousers. More specifically, the Iranian regime employed crowdsourcing techniques to assemble
an aggregate of pictures with similar faces and identify individuals involved with protests,
leading to their arrests (10). Morozov believes the Internet creates a cyber “Trinity of
Authoritarianism”—propaganda, censorship and surveillance—in which networked regimes
possess innovative abilities to control their populations powered by the Internet (82).
Morozov acknowledges that the Web can initiate freedom, but in a very limited context.
He emphasizes that it is not the Internet that can promote freedom, characterizing such thinking
as internet-centrism— “[a] pernicious tendency to place Internet technologies before the
environment in which they operate—[which] gives policymakers a false sense of comfort, a false
hope that by designing a one-size-fits-all technology that destroy whatever firewall it sees, they
will also solve the problem of Internet control” (111). Morozov argues that there are two
converging lines of thinking: freedom of the Internet and freedom via the Internet. In this regard,
he criticizes U.S. Foreign policy initiatives that promote the Web as illogical. All authoritarian
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nations, including China, want information to free flow because they benefit from tracking ICT
data of their citizens. Thus, Morozov poses the problem as not access to information, but the
ways in which authoritarian regimes use the Web to reinforce their power. In this light, Morozov
states that, “most of the firewalls to be destroyed are social and political rather than technological
in nature” (111). Towards the end of The Net Delusion, Morozov offers the cyber-realist policy
maker as the antagonist to the cyber-utopian (318). Instead of thinking in grand terms of whether
the Internet undermines or strengthens democracy, the cyber-realist, in Morozov’s words, would
anticipate that the Internet “is poised to produce different policy outcomes in different
environments” (320).
From Larry Diamond’s anthology of ICT essays, Liberation Technology: Social Media
and the Struggle for Democracy, Chapters 2 and 3, respectively titled “Liberation v. Control: the
Future of Cyberspace” by Ronald Deibert and Rafal Rohozinskit, and “International Mechanisms
of Cyberspace Controls” by Deibert, collectively shed light on the fact that most democratic
nations engage in Internet-content filtering. As a result, all global citizens are now subjected to
the most surveillance and invasion of personal privacy in history (19). Deibert’s argument rests
on what he perceives as an all-out blitz on civil society on the Web. Regime type no longer
matters, since all nations invoke national security laws to impose broader acts of censorship (25).
Moreover, Deibert worries that democracies’ rationalizations for such actions only strengthen
authoritarian regimes’ legitimacy in employing the same technologies, but for perhaps cruder
ends (44). This “propagation and diffusion of bad norms” arguably has accelerated with the
recent NSA revelations, which simultaneously delegitimize the U.S. government, but also
legitimize authoritarian practices of the same sort (44). While some emphasize the growth of
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civil society due to the Internet, Deibert raises an alarm that civil societies are under siege by
both authoritarian regimes and democracies.
While Deibert reflects upon the ethical implications of democracies legitimizing the use
of authoritarian-styled controls like web filtering, Rebecca MacKinnon uncovers networked
authoritarian regimes’ methods of silencing digital unrest. Specifically, MacKinnon focuses on
China’s manipulation of its Internet to reinforce its political control. MacKinnon’s work shows
how the CCP encourages a civil society via ICTs in China, but only to a certain extent. Part of
MacKinnon’s research highlights the varying tiers of sophisticated technological methods of
controlling dissent. In her policy recommendation MacKinnon promotes a “freedom of the Web”
sort of argument, which may be seen as vaguely cyber-utopian, or optimistically cyber-realist.
She concludes that civil society would grow rapidly in a cyberspace free of Chinese ownership
and censorship, and emerge as a much more powerful tool for citizens seeking to hold
governments and corporations accountable (XXVII). While her contributions to researching the
state control of the Web in China are acutely cyber-realist, MacKinnon’s recommendation
emphasizes that ICTs are essential to building a more vibrant civil society that will ultimately
demand more freedoms and democracy. Again, this reinforces that cyber-utopianism and cyberrealism are not mutually exclusive, but often converge when assessing the liberalizing effects of
the Internet.
Interestingly enough, cyber-utopianism faces off against cyber-realism in Chapter 10 of
Liberation Technology, entitled “Social Media, Dissent, and Iran’s Green Movement,” written by
Mehdi Yahyanejad and Elham Gheytanchi. While paying respect to both Diamond’s and
Morozov’s opposing arguments, the authors write about the successes and shortcomings of the
Iranian Green Movement in 2009. Yahyanejad and Gheytanchi view social media as an
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important factor in slowly liberalizing Iran. Yet they both realize that ICTs are not nearly as
productive as many Westerns initially thought, even going as far as to negate the Iranian Green
Movement as a “Twitter Revolution” (150). Thus, at the same time, the authors heed to
Morozov’s, and cyber-realists largely, argument by conceding the lack of sophisticated social
media use on the behalf of the movement, and also sophisticated use of technology by the
Iranians to stunt the growth of the demonstrations (151). The authors lament that the civil society
built in Iran was not strong enough to mount an actual revolution or extended dissonance. This
example also illustrates how cyber-utopianism and cyber-realism interact without being mutually
exclusive.
Jonathan Zittrain’s 2008 book, The Future of the Internet and How to Stop it,
acknowledges the catch-22 of technology tools. Morozov’s wariness of technology in the hands
of authoritarian regimes can be traced back to Zittrain’s ideas. For instance Zittrain describes
hypothetical nefarious abuses of ICTs to develop sophisticated eavesdropping technology. “They
can turn a standard mobile phone into a roving microphone—whether or not it is being used for a
call” (4). Most importantly, Zittrain anticipates these uses as beneficial to law enforcement in
areas under democratic rule of law, but would be detrimental in “technology-embracing
authoritarian states” (5). Thus, Zittrain dismisses the argument as whether the Internet is even
“open.” Instead, he argues that technology itself is neutral, and neither inherently prodemocratizing nor does it favor the state. As a result, Zittrain’s work becomes even more
important as democratic states, like the United States, engage in more authoritarian behavior
from a formerly “open” source. The collusion between technology makers and states tends to
shift the tone of the overall impact of the Internet as a democratizing force to a more skeptical
outlook. Therefore, Zittrain predicts the demise of civil society online due to the state’s
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uninhibited ability to better use the tool of the Internet and ICTs to stunt socio-political
movements.
Tim Wu’s book, The Master Switch: the Rise and Fall of Information Empires, warns
against the potential of the Internet as an “open” information arena. Wu does not stress the
openness of the Internet in terms of access, but rather in terms of power. Using a historical
example of traditional media in the United States during the 20th century, Wu focuses on the
monopolization of information and communication technologies like AT&T’s (Bell) grasp on
telecommunications and NBC’s and CBS’s domination of radio to emphasize how new
technologies are similarly consolidated into conglomerates. Enter the Internet. Wu targets
Google, which dominates the information technology market by not producing any content, but
rather selling advertisements based on information taken from its search technology (281). Thus,
Wu’s thesis that new technologies are quickly monopolized and their innovativeness
consolidated, thereby defeating the idea that the digital civil society and ICTs create its own
content and power. In turn, Wu argues that companies like Google often have more power, and
more important power—a deluge of information about its users—, which intelligence agencies
crave. Wu also makes an appearance in the PBS Frontline documentary, The United States of
Secrets, in May 2014, in which he critiques the sinister relationship between Silicon Valley
technology companies and federal agencies like the NSA.
Recently, several other authors published cyber-realist books in early 2015. Bruce
Schneier’s book Data and Goliath: the Hidden Battles to Collect Your Data and Control Your
World argues, “data is the exhaust of the information age” and cautions how data is a by-product
of high-tech socialization powered by ICTs (14). Schneier attacks the government and
technology companies’ justifications for mass collection of data as insufficient compared to the
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massive incursion of privacy the all encompassing surveillance imposes. Schneier’s argument
against mass surveillance as ineffective in stopping terrorist attacks exposes the mislead motives
of states to collect data because data is control.

	
  
The goal of this thesis is to assess how civil society on the Web in authoritarian regimes
and democracies has either shrunk or grown in the context of a post-Snowden world. Grassroots
movements in the United States and the Arab Spring resurge the liberalizing potential of ICTs.
But even if the revolution will not be tweeted as Malcolm Gladwell declares, it is essential to
understand how states use the Web to crush rebellions while constraining the most
transformative mode of communication. This thesis seeks to measure how effective the Internet
has been at shifting the balance of power in political movements and states. Also, what are the
implication of a stunted civil society online via state control of ICTs, as exhibited in China and
possibly in the U.S. Lastly, although we consider civil society a pre-condition for democracy and
a component of a vibrant democratic society, active societies like terrorist organizations also use
the Web to project their ideas and recruit members.
As the literature review demonstrates, the answer is neither clear nor absolute. Cyberutopianism may be overstated, and much more akin to cyber-realism now than in 2009. The
events that have transpired since then, namely the Arab Spring, Occupy Movement, NSA
Revelations, state repression, and ISIS, all relied on ICTs to facilitate their respective causes.
Ultimately, its not a question of whether the Internet fuels political change, but how political
actors use ICTs and whether it empowers individuals and political grassroots movements, or
state power. The first chapter seeks to analyze the impact of the state-controlled Web in China.
The CCP’s domination of the Internet presents a seminal example of how the web can reinforce
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state power and entrench state control. I will address the question as to whether a civil society
can emerge online in an authoritarian state like China. And if so, to what extent does these online
communities group have any source of political legitimacy or acknowledgement from the state.
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Chapter Two: Chinese Control of ICTs
China’s civil war in the mid-1940s ended with a Communist victory in 1949 led by Mao
Zedong against the U.S.-backed Nationalist forces. The relationship between China and the rest
of the world became more closed off, especially to capitalist states. In 1989, the protests in
Tiananmen Square encouraged the view that democracy had seeped into China. Yet the world
watched as the CCP reinforced its power with violent repressive tactics. Many observers believe
that a subsequent wave of democratization manifested by ICTs offers a new challenge to the
stability of the Party’s authoritarian regime. Access to the Internet for large numbers of Chinese
citizens opens up a cyber-sphere in which newly formed netizens create, share, and learn
information quickly and relatively freely. Websites such as Sina Weibo, a Chinese equivalent of
Twitter, revolutionize the manner in which concerned citizens organize and spread
communications, and possibly dissent in cyberspace. Therefore, many scholars argue that the
Internet can act as a democratizing force, allowing for greater freedom of speech, which will
revolutionize the political life of the Chinese and lead to the crumbling of the Chinese
Communist Party. However, this is a drastic simplification of the many dynamic forces
impacting how the Chinese use ICTs. The history of the Internet in China presents a case study
that emphasizes the resiliency of the repressive regime, while offering flashes of a burgeoning
civil society online.
In 1994, the first global Internet connection was made in China (Liang, 104). The next
year in 1995, the CCP invested heavily in the Internet by building the necessary infrastructure for
commercial consumption (MacKinnon, 34). Initially, the Chinese Internet population failed to
see expansive growth, only reaching 2 million active members by 1998 (Liang, 105). However,
this figure then grew exponentially, reaching 100 million users in 2005 and climbing to 298
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million by the end of 2008 (Liang, 105). The capitalist economic reforms beginning in 1978
improved the majority of lives in China and facilitated the use of the Internet for a large number
of Chinese citizens. Instead of staving off the Internet and its alleged liberalizing effects, the
Party actively invested in the rapid development of telecommunication infrastructure to fund the
“Internet boom” in China (Liang, 105). Statistics indicate that in November 2011, there were 457
million Internet users in China, yet by January of 2012, figures showed that the number of
netizens had expanded to 513 million (Simpson, 1). Furthermore, these numbers are expected to
grow to 650 million, almost half of the Chinese population, by 2015 (Leibold, 1).
The brief overview of the CCP’s responsibility in the “Internet boom” and its
determination to establish the sovereignty of Chinese cyberspace leads to a more specialized
question regarding the Internet as a democratizing instrument. Two distinct and ongoing
scholarly arguments debate the unsettled question of the Internet as a democratizing tool. The
pro-democracy camp—akin to cyber-utopians—explains that the integration of capitalism would
ultimately lead to a gradual democratization from within (Gilley 62). Similarly, this prodemocratic thought believes the integration of the Internet will champion liberalizing principles
such as free speech and eventually democracy in a closed, authoritarian China. While the cyberrealist position claims that the Party—in the interest of preserving its power—will do whatever
means necessary to stave off the ICTs’ liberalizing effects. First, do the Chinese even bother with
politics online?

How the Chinese Use ICTs
These statistics illustrate the rapid growth of Chinese Internet users, but now it is
important to uncover what most Chinese do on the Web. In a more precise scope, Chinese
cyberspace has undergone a “blogging revolution” with a staggering 181 million Chinese users

Kerr 23
blogging, according to figures in 2011 (Leibold, 1). By 2011, numbers indicate that Chinese use
of microblogs, such as Sina Weibo, increased to over 250 million, signifying the massive
popularity of “Twitter equivalents” which serve the purpose of broadcasting information across
the large, accessible Chinese Web (Simpson, 1). Consequently, the potential for collective
organization and sharing of information is possible with microblogs. Guobin Yang describes the
Chinese Internet culture as full of, “humor, play, and irreverence…it is also participatory and
contentious” (Yang, 2). Bulletin-board systems (BBS), online communities, and blogs represent
the most used tools on the Chinese Internet (Yang, 2). Essentially, Yang argues that the
integration of the Internet transforms citizens into netizens by allowing them to relatively freely
search through cyberspace and post comments to news articles or public forums on BBS. As a
result, Yang concludes that ordinary people are now engaged via the Internet and find meaning
and power in their solitary voice over the Web. Yang—in cyber-utopian fashion—reasons that
the formation of an online voice transforms into online activism since the instantaneous web
facilitates information sharing and organization between other connected Internet users.
Furthermore, the Internet allows for public discourse or dissent without immediate physical
danger. Also, online activists maximize their communicative methods by utilizing mobile
Internet to broadcast gathering areas and capture footage more effectively.

The Web Apolitically Strengthens Regime Power
Some may argue that the Internet acts a sanctuary for public discussion since public
demonstration is vehemently guarded against as evident in the Tiananmen Square incident in
1989 (Tang, 459). However, (Leibold contrasts with Yang’s “rosy assessment of the impact of
the blogosphere on Chinese society” (Leibold, 2). Surveys indicate that the, “leading uses of the
Internet in China are: search (82%), music (79%), news (77%), instant messaging (77%), and
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gaming (67%)” (Leibold, 2). Therefore, the Internet functions more as an “entertainment
highway,” than as a “information superhighway.” Thus, Chinese people are just like their global
counterparts and seemingly not very political in their use of the Internet.

The Apolitical Use of the Web Strengthens Regime Power
Other scholars unconvinced by the democratization effect of the Internet explore how the
Internet can actually strengthen the Party’s grip on power without any censorship methods.
Rather the Internet itself entertains the Chinese people and effectively depoliticizes them
(Leibold, 3). Furthermore, the Internet, some argue, is an open, unregulated wasteland of rumors
and “misinformation” that contribute to a weakening of faith in the liberalizing effects of ICTs
(Leibold, 4). The “human-flesh search engines” represent a new form of online activism known
as online vigilantism, which targets alleged social offenders to justice by using the power of
sharing information on the web (Leibold, 3). However, Leibold argues that it rather leads to a
digital form of libel via a “digital scarlet letter” (Leibold, 3). For example, a jealous ex-boyfriend
created a weblog in his former girlfriend’s name claiming to be an “AIDS-infected prostitute
who enjoyed unprotected sex with over 200 clients” (Leibold, 5). As a result, the victim received
death threats and lost her job from the outrage of “online lynch mobs,” who believed the exboyfriend’s absurd claims (Leibold, 5). Between the years 2003 and 2007, with the explosion of
the Internet and human-flesh search engines, the number of Chinese people who thought the
Internet was reliable shrunk from fifty-two percent to twenty-six percent (Leibold, 3).
The burgeoning distrust in the Internet introduces a familiar trend, which Jaron Lanier
labels, “digital Maoism,” or “the propensity of online collectivism to wreak havoc” (Leibold, 6).
Furthermore, these cyber-witch trials can be used against corrupt local Party leaders. In this way
the Party can channel these online lynch mobs to expose corruption or abuses of power on a local
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level to create a democratic façade thereby legitimizing and strengthening their rule. Some
evidence, such as the exploitative use of human-flesh search engines, distracts and divides the
Chinese masses. In an ultimate paradox the advent of freedom of speech on the Internet may
perpetuate a cycle of fear that is conducive to the self-censorship of dissent. Instead, cyber witchhunts made possible by the Internet create a new forum of wrongful accusations eerily similar to
the Cultural Revolution in the 1960s in China. Regardless, the CCP does not rely on the cyber
witch-hunts to protect its rule. Instead the CCP proactively installs measures to contain any
liberalizing effects of the Web that may threaten its power.

A Sovereign Chinese Internet
The expansion of the Internet does not simply guarantee the automatic democratization of
China nor is it likely that the Internet evolves into a politically charged environment for the
newly constituted netizens. Rather, the Chinese Communist Party understands the Internet as a
threat to its legitimacy and stability. Despite Internet’s democratization effects in China, such as
greater opportunity for free speech, the Internet, the Party’s control of ICTS will curb any
challenge to power. The CCP continuously mitigates the liberalizing impact of the Web by
implementing pre-emptive measures, which then enable them to censor their cyberspace to
ensure stability and economic growth.
In response to expanding Internet use in Chinese society, the CCP developed
technologies to censor and filter politically sensitive data. As stated previously, the CCP itself
invested heavily into the Internet to gain economically by connecting to the global network.
Essentially, to remain a force in the global marketplace and attract foreign investment to China,
its cyber infrastructure had to be constructed. Thus, the CCP appears to be in a catch-22 in
developing the Internet for economic purposes, while simultaneously protecting against the
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liberalization effects of an open Web that could weaken the stability of the regime. Therefore,
the CCP fears foreign influence in the cyberspace and works relentlessly to create a sovereign
Chinese Internet.
The “Great Firewall” of China serves the purpose to design a sophisticated control of
infrastructure in which the government needs to approve network connections and insulate
Chinese ICTs from foreign influence (Liang, 106). Furthermore, the “Great Firewall” filters
uncensored information from Chinese citizens, thus making them inaccessible to the rest of the
Internet world (Hua, 12). This is possible from the Chinese built fiber-optic infrastructure than
enabled ICTs, which allowed the Party to install censoring and filtering mechanisms to sift
politically sensitive data. The Great Firewall limits the access to foreign information available to
Chinese Internet users; for example, the Firewall blocks terms like “Tiananmen Square” and
even “Tahrir Square.” The Chinese system censors outside information but allows a flow of
information to work through its own native Facebook and Twitter tools, like Sina Weibo and
Wechat that produce liberalizing effects by facilitating communication and organization.
Instead of adopting foreign services, the creation of Chinese technology companies
ensures compliance with the government’s requests for data and strict censorship demands.
Moreover, the proliferation of Chinese Internet and technology companies lessens the Party’s
dependence on Western services like Facebook by implementing Chinese social networking
platforms like RenRen and Kaixinwang (MacKinnon, 48). The Chinese Internet companies may
at first express concern over the Party’s censorship and surveillance requirements, yet the
economic monopoly, created by the CCP’s aversion to Western influence, allows Chinese
companies to service the world’s biggest Internet base (MacKinnon, 49). Recent privacy
agreement updates in 2012 to the widest used ICT in China, Sina Weibo, bans users from saying
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“untrue” statements (OpenNet Initiative). MacKinnon describes this method of ICT control as
possible via the “deconstruction of a legal environment legitimizing information
control…authorities informal requests to companies for removal of information, technical
shutdowns of websites, and computer-network attacks”(MacKinnon article, 43). Again, this
manifests the CCP’s power in legal department of Chinese technology companies, which creates
a sovereign Web dictated and controlled by the Party (OpenNet Initiative). Thus economic
freedom does not require “the free flow information,” as widely thought by initial pro-Internet
pundits that believed economic modernization would simultaneously usher in political
democratization. Instead the Party’s deep structural design of the Web and its influence over
those who produce services and content trade off the liberalizing effects of ICTs for economic
profit (MacKinnon, 49).

Networked Authoritarianism: Selective Censorship and Surveillance
However, what is more interesting than a firewall that simply blocks information is how
the CCP focuses on stabilizing the online public mood by monitoring what people say (Li, 71).
The newfound ability of netizens to comment on media and newspaper’s articles compels the
CCP to censor any data that it considers “incorrect” (Hua, 3). The CCP employs Internet police
that daily monitor and censor politically damaging material and distribute pro-Party propaganda
via the “Fifty Centers” (Hua, 13). This censorship agency promotes and nurtures a progovernment viewpoint on the Web. Dissident Internet users label them “the Fifty Centers”
because they are paid fifty cents for each pro-government comment and for bashing antigovernment comments (Hua, 13). Cheng Hua an anonymous media employee in China considers
the CCP’s proactive censorship methods as an over-extension and a clear infringement on the
Chinese’s basic human right to free thought and speech. Like Guobin Yang, Hua exalts the
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microblog site, Sina Weibo, which contains some dissenting views of the CCP for all netizens to
see (Hua, 13). Hua believes that the presence of dissenting information signifies the Party’s
inability to censor every ‘click’ and angry tapping of keyboard. Consequently, they believe such
‘relaxed’ behavior emphasizes the strength of the Internet in promoting the freedom of speech.
Yet, such thinking may be misleading; others speculate that the Internet and its users help the
CCP distract and depoliticize the Chinese people. Ultimately the Party is more concerned about
collective efforts rather than isolated criticisms on the Web. This could possibly explain the
sparse evidence of dissent on Weibo.

Legal Control of ICTs
A special Internet police force was established to aid in the state’s Internet surveillance
(Liang, 106). Many departments and agencies including the State Council, Ministry of Public
Security, Ministry of Culture, and State Secrets Bureau, form a coalition to use and enforce
Internet censorship and aid its development (Liang, 108). In 2005, the Chinese bureaucracy
published, “Provisions on the Administration of Internet News and Information Services,” to
justify Internet control and censorship of news organizations by the government in order to
“serve socialism and adhere to the correct direction of public opinion” (Hua, 12). Most recently,
during the 18th Party Congress in Beijing from November 8-12, 2014, Hu Jintao reinforced the
Party’s stance on censoring the web by saying, “we [CCP] should strengthen social management
of the Internet and promote standardized and orderly network operation” (Ansfield, 2). Over the
course of the expansive Internet growth, the CCP provides a copious amount of laws and
regulations to legitimize their containment and ownership of the Chinese Internet. An excerpt
from the June 8, 2010, White Paper entitled, “The Internet in China,” under Section V
“Protecting Internet Security” codifies the illegality of any liberalizing effects produced by ICTs:
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The Decision of the National People's Congress Standing Committee on Guarding
Internet Security, Regulations on Telecommunications of the People's Republic of China
and Measures on the Administration of Internet Information Services stipulate that no
organization or individual may produce, duplicate, announce or disseminate information
having the following contents: being against the cardinal principles set forth in the
Constitution; endangering state security, divulging state secrets, subverting state power
and jeopardizing national unification; damaging state honor and interests; instigating
ethnic hatred or discrimination and jeopardizing ethnic unity; jeopardizing state religious
policy, propagating heretical or superstitious ideas; spreading rumors, disrupting social
order and stability; disseminating obscenity, pornography, gambling, violence, brutality
and terror or abetting crime; humiliating or slandering others, trespassing on the lawful
rights and interests of others; and other contents forbidden by laws and administrative
regulations.
Therefore the stern policies articulated by CCP headquarters in Beijing reinforce the Party’s
steadfast determination to maintain stability and protect economic interests on the Web. As
stated previously, the introduction of the Internet was economically necessary for the CCP. Thus,
the Party adapted to the liberalization effects of the Internet in China. The Party has contained
these “democratizing” effects and limited them to a social platform; however, the CCP uses such
innovative technology to censor and manipulate online discourse to stop an opposition
movement from challenging their power. Therefore, some believe that the CCP has shifted from
classical authoritarianism (pre-Internet) to a networked authoritarianism, or adaptive
authoritarianism.
Learning from past experiences, the Party continuously upgrades and sophisticates its
tactics in controlling their Internet. Specifically, the CCP employs pre-emptive measures instead
of reactive measures to prevent the emergence of any significant online opposition. The ‘Great
Firewall’ method does not depict how brilliantly the CCP handles the democratic power of the
Internet. Rather, it is helpful to think of the Chinese Internet controls of censorship, surveillance,
and manipulation of information as similar to that of a hydroelectric water-management system
(MacKinnon, 37). The managers, or the CCP, have both “routine and crisis management goals:
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managing daily flows and distribution on the one and managing droughts and floods on the
other” (MacKinnon, 37). Thus from a long-term perspective, the CCP prevents any significant
opposition from mobilizing through its daily censorship and monitoring Chinese-controlled
micro-blogs. In fact, most recently about half of Sina Weibo has been infiltrated and censored,
displaying the effectiveness of CCP’s sophisticated censorship technology (Ansfield, 2). In 2010,
Wang Chen, head of the CCP’s propaganda department and chief of the State Council
Information Office reported that “350 million pieces of ‘harmful content’ had been deleted from
the Chinese Internet over the course of one year” (MacKinnon, 39). The CCP realizes the
importance of the Internet to the Chinese people and does not completely block all avenues of
social media—unless they are foreign sites—thereby emphasizing the CCP’s flexibility in
maintaining stability. Furthermore, the CCP’s ICT management tactics reveals a massive
complex system with fluctuating parts that demands flexibility that classic authoritarianism could
not accomplish.
No longer does the Party rely on Internet filtering as their sole weapon in Internet control.
More sophisticated methods of control are enabled by the traceability of digital data produced by
ICTs. Additionally, the CCP launches cyber attacks on dissidents’ e-mail accounts to stop the
attempted transfer of information to the mainland (MacKinnon article, 39). More sophisticated
tactics, include “warrantless surveillance, the creation of ‘national cyber-zones,’ state-sponsored
information campaigns, and direct physical action to silence individuals or groups” (MacKinnon
article, 43). In China, classical surveillance evolves into networked surveillance under the CCP’s
expansive Internet resources. Internet cafes in China must be registered with the CCP and agree
to enforce its laws which forbid online gambling and pornographic content (Liang, 113).
Frustrated by the growth in the number of Internet cafes, in 2003 the CCP introduced a “chain-
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store standard management model” to standardize café procedures in line with CCP Internet
protocol (Liang, 114). Such cybercafés require identity registration when logging on a computer,
thus emphasizing the meticulous and roundabout manner in which the CCP can track down any
excessive criticisms (MacKinnon, 41). Furthermore, the CCP can tap into its constant
surveillance online “via its infrastructural and technological equipment and skills” due to its
ownership of the Internet ‘pipeline’ (Liang, 114).

Input Institutions: Party Responsiveness
The White Paper “The Internet in China” was published online from the Information
Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China on June 8, 2010. In section II
entitled “Promoting the extensive use of the Internet,” the Party document cites how the Party’s
acceptance of the Internet improves its citizens’ lives while reinforcing its legitimacy as
responsive to its people, especially in the wake of disaster.
Soon after earthquakes hit Wenchuan in Sichuan Province and Yushu in Qinghai
Province, and a severe drought plagued southwest China, netizens used the Internet to
spread disaster relief information, initiate rescue efforts and express sympathy and
concern, fully demonstrating the irreplaceable role of the Internet.

	
  
Through the Internet, the Party responds to incidences such as a 2001 school explosion in rural
Jiangxi Province that the CCP attempted to cover up and compelled the CCP to reveal the truth
(Yang, 222). This increased level of transparency produced by ICTs prompts scholars to analyze
the impact of public discourse on the Internet and how it affects the news media and erodes Party
propaganda imbedded in the news (Yang, 225). The Party itself accepts the growing voices of
the people to a certain extent. Therefore, the Party uses surveillance tactics that aims at the head
of any opposition movement. Thus, dissidents like Ai Weiwei and other Democratic activists
receive much more attention and repression than the casual Internet surfing citizen (Ai, xxiii).
Ai Weiwei combats the surveillance efforts by exposing his life “in his tweets and blogs, as well
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as in interviews and even self-documentaries” (Strafella and Berg, 152). The digital grassroots
tools Ai Weiwei developed serves two functions according to Strafella and Berg—to “highlight
the absurdity of life under the regime and to spread humanistic compassion” (152). The CCP has
no intention to relinquish power; the Internet has actually strengthened its power even more so
by integrating digital surveillance and monitoring techniques.
Guobin Yang’s book, The Power of the Internet in China concedes that the Party
continuously refines its “methods of control and governance,” thus perceiving the ICT’s
democratizing effects as constantly countered and squandered (Yang, 222). Yet, Yang sifts
through his troublesome findings to proclaim that the most important outcome of the Internet is
the establishment of an “unofficial democracy” which creates a social manifestation of
democracy within the Chinese Internet (Yang, 223). Although a pro-democracy proponent, Yang
recognizes the craftiness of the CCP and their pre-emptive responsiveness in allowing the
Internet to satisfy their “immediate social need” without any political change (Yang, 225).
Therefore, according to Yang, the unofficial democracy created by ICTs is the first step into
changing the social and waking the social consciousness of all ICT-connected Chinese of their
power, “to speak up, link up and act up against power, corruption, and social justice” (Yang,
225). Yet is this enough to initiate political change?

Input institutions: Democratic Façade
Apart from natural disaster and social responsiveness, ICTs allow the Party to be more
responsive to the political demands of the Chinese people, albeit restricted to censorship. Party
officials solicit feedback from citizens via “e-parliament” website on policy implementation as
well as abuses of power at the local level (MacKinnon, 43). In turn the Party gains legitimacy
and presents a democratic façade to its citizens. For average Chinese people ICTs serve as an
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input institution that enable considerable freedom to comment on news and post on BBS forums,
although they may be censored (Tang, 464). The CCP allows different viewpoints; however,
once an Internet user explicitly condemns the Party and attempts to subvert it, the user may face
harsh imprisonment if caught. Thus, the CCP encourages Internet users to believe they have a
voice individually and not in the form of a political movement. In this spirit, the CCP initiates
campaigns to foster a seemingly open political environment. For instance, both Hu Jintao and
Wen Jiabao, the President and Premier of the ruling regime in China, hosted online
communication with Web surfers via this e-parliament platform in an attempt to utilize the
Internet as a transparent tool for citizens to use (Liang, 110). This political stunt legitimizes
China’s total control of the Internet by making themselves available to the masses via the Web
and encouraging interacting online to ensure the collection of all citizens’ data.
The freedom to communicate over the Web and the presence of a “social democracy on
the Web offers a different perspective than the Western fears of the Chinese Internet as closed
and under heavy surveillance. Some believe the presence of the Internet allows activists “to
continuously test the limits of such control and quickly exploit any ‘structural’ weakness (Tang,
469). Yet, the evidence suggests that the CCP has been many steps ahead of those who use the
Internet as a democratizing force since the Party relentlessly implements stronger fortifications
and mechanisms to contain the liberalizing effects of the Web. Although relations in China have
been relaxed considerably with the integration of the Web, they serve as a façade that hides the
clear facts that China controls Chinese cyberspace, but selectively targets opposition leaders
rather than repressing the entire Internet user population. Thus, the Party’s current emphasis on
fighting corruption is an ingenious way of enlisting the population in an effort to make the
government more accountable and thereby presumably more legitimate. This evolution of

Kerr 34
networked authoritarianism shows that China “embraces Internet connectivity not merely as
essential for a world-class economic and financial power, but also as necessary form of modern
government” (MacKinnon, 28). However, it remains vague how a social democracy can grow
into a political entity within the CCP’s stringent and omnipresent control of Chinese cyberspace.
These refining techniques of the network authoritarianism reveal the Party’s two-pronged
approach to containing the liberalizing effects of the Web: it represses dissent while also
legitimizing the citizens’ perception of the Party, which both together strengthens authoritarian
power. The Party combats the liberalizing effects of the Web by constantly upgrading its
sophisticated technology to track and eliminate significant challengers. The effects of this twopronged approach were evident in the suppression of Arab Spring news on Chinese blogs in
2011. In response, the Party detained bloggers using the transcripts from social networking sites
to interrogate the digital dissidents (MacKinnon, 42). Thus, the Party’s selective use of cyberattacking prominent members of the dissident opposition and the overall daily propaganda crew
that polishes the Internet with superfluous popular support all contribute to limiting the
democratizing effects of the Internet.

The Impact of Chinese Internet Policy on other States
Nevertheless, the United States government believes wholeheartedly in the gradual
democratization of China impelled by capitalism and its free-market forces, including the
Internet. The United States government ideologically opposes the construction of the Chinese
Web and Great Firewall because it keeps foreign websites out of the Chinese cyberspace. In
2010, U.S Secretary of State Hilary Clinton’s speech, “Internet Freedom,” reinforced the United
States’ formal policy regarding China’s closed and censored Internet (MacKinnon, 32). Clinton
claimed that “one single, free and open global Internet is an essential prerequisite for freedom
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and democracy in the twenty-first century” (MacKinnon, 32). China rebuked Clinton’s
comments, stating that, “China’s management of the Internet is in accordance with the law, and
is in line with international practice” (Tzw-Wei, 4). The Chinese foreign ministry spokesman
Ma Zhaoxu also lamented that the U.S. disapproval is biased due to their hegemonic motives,
“American’s intention to claim Internet hegemony” (Tze-Wei, 4). The CCP continues to defend
its internal Internet censorship policies with the “White Paper” which declares that Internet
control remains “under the jurisdiction of Chinese sovereignty” (Priscilla, 4). Strikingly in
hindsight, both the U.S. and China share similar monitoring tactics on the Web to ensure control.
The U.S. denounced the “Great Firewall” as anti-democratic, but in practice its intelligence
agencies carry out similar operations to surveil electronic metadata collected from its people’s
ICTs.
In 2014, China held its first world Internet conference in which they called for, “common
ground while resolving differences to establish a multilateral, democratic and transparent
international Internet governance system” (BBC News China). The highest-ranking Chinese
official attending the conference, Vice Premier Ma Kai, emphasized that all countries should
severely strike at Internet terrorism activities and work together against cyber-attacks. Contrary
to traditional isolationism, it seems as though China now regards its stringent Internet policy as
adoptable by other states. William Nee, China Researcher at Amnesty International, warns that
Internet freedom is under attack by governments across the world. Nee says, “Now China
appears eager to promote its own domestic Internet rules as a model for global regulation…This
should send a chill down the spine of anyone that values online freedom" (BBC News China).
China’s justification of its massive surveillance and censorship is rooted in threats against
terrorism, but this is largely illusionary; rather this repressive dragnet is constructed to crush any
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sign of mountable dissent to achieve total political control.

Conclusion: Net Effect of ICTs in China
The Party’s elaborate control of ICTs is a transferable example of how to manipulate the
built-in vulnerabilities and design of the Internet beyond than a generic firewall. The presence of
the ICT devices themselves will not usher in an overthrow of the CCP—actual people and
political organizations can accomplish such a task. Therefore, it may be completely plausible that
many pro-democracy activists hype and exaggerate the impact of the Internet. Regardless of how
some Chinese use the Internet, the Party safeguards and controls the Chinese cyberspace to
lessen its impact for instrumental change, while simultaneously allowing for much smaller
incremental change that provides the Chinese with greater freedoms and presents the mirage of
an “unofficial” social democracy. In the long-term the CCP will squash any outwardly threat at
the regime, and has laid the groundwork with expansive infrastructure ownership and
sophisticated monitoring and pre-emptive tools for eliminating the possibility of pro-democracy
opposition groups mobilizing on the Internet in China. In a paradoxical sense, the Internet did
bring about liberalization in the sense of greater tools for limited free speech; however,
democracy has not taken root in China nor does evidence suggests it will any time soon due to
the control of dissent via ICTs. Instead, the Chinese model outlines an effective way to maintain
power even while allowing and encouraging use ICTs, thanks to the two-pronged approach that
censors harmful information and elicits feedback to construct the perception of a responsive
government.
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Chapter 3: ISIS’ Spinternet: ICT Propaganda
In the following chapter I will investigate how the Islamic State of Syria and the Levant,
known as ISIS, harnesses twenty-first century ICTs to broadcast its message in a visual format
across the world in hopes of attracting more followers to join the newly christened, seventh
century-styled caliphate. Perhaps in emulation of the CCP’s elaborate censorship and propaganda
efforts, ISIS’ own media production team, known as Al-Hayat media center, floods the Internet
daily with Hollywood-like productions that range from firing squads, decapitations, counterWestern reporting, evidence of state-building, and youth indoctrination. In order to best
understand how ISIS wages this war online, I had to examine this evidence as a primary source,
no matter how horrifying and sickening due to the lack of scholarly research in late 2014.
Western media companies such as Twitter attempt to censor the gory images posted repeatedly.
However, this measure merely censors a small percentage of the graphic posts, and does little to
stem the tide of ISIS propaganda online. Once a video uploads to the Internet, third party
websites and users can quickly copy and re-disseminate it online. Thus citizens across the world
with an Internet connection can access this message through a simple Google search that reveals
the same message spawned on a myriad of third-party websites.
That being said, I navigated murky websites, but have found a reliable, scholarly, and
most importantly unedited, reposting of ISIS’ jihadi videos at www.jihadology.net; a
clearinghouse website run by Aaron Zelin, a Richard Borow Fellow at the Washington Institute,
Rena and Sami David Fellow at ICSR, and PhD candidate at King's College London. I have
categorized ISIS propaganda videos into three different functions: terror, statehood, and
international recruitment that defy the cyber-utopian expectations of ICTs as solely liberalizing
effects. Like, Neil Postman said, how technology is used by one culture is not necessarily the
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only way it could be used (Postman Lecture). Still fledgling, ISIS uses ICTs to help consolidate
power. The ICT propaganda arm is akin to role of the Fifty Centers is China, except for ISIS’
repugnant content. First, the recent establishment of the Islamic State, known as either ISIS or
ISIL, must be explained.

Background and Formation of the Islamic State
In the years following the 2003 Iraq war, ex-Saddam Hussein military leaders, al-Qaeda
remnants, and freed prisoners took refuge in the failing state of Syria during its civil war in 2011
(Hubbard and Schmitt). Before 2013 this group identified as another splintered Islamic
fundamentalist camp. In June of 2014, its leader and self-proclaimed caliph, Abu Bakr alBaghdadi announced the creation of the Islamic State along with the seizing Mosul, the second
largest Iraqi city. Although still known globally by its original acronym ISIS, or ISIL, meaning
the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, or the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, al-Baghdadi refers
to the organization as simply the Islamic State, thus emphasizing its expansive, transnational
goal, and not limiting itself to Iraq and Syria. For the purposes of this case study, I will refer to
the organization by its most well known name, ISIS.
Even though ISIS emerged out of the crippled shell of a mostly defeated Iraqi al-Qaeda,
al-Baghdadi runs an organization that by most accounts is more strict and violent than previous
incarnations. For example, al-Baghdadi encourages an extermination campaign against religious
minorities, like Shiites and Yazidis, which has been denounced by al-Qaeda (Arango and
Schmitt). Also, unlike Bin Laden’s or al-Zarqawi’s al-Qaeda, al-Baghdadi controls an army and
wide stretches of land from northern Syria including a long stretch of the Turkish-Syrian border.
The reach of ISIS also encompasses virtually all of northern Iraq, stretching as close to 60 miles
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from Baghdad. In turn, ISIS has taken on state duties—it does not aspire to be a group hiding in
the mountains, rather it wishes to rule captured areas, impose sharia law, and gain legitimacy.
ISIS has benefitted greatly from the Syrian Civil War by capturing state-run oil fields and
refineries that finance its operations. It is estimated that ISIS earns between $1-2 million per day
from producing oil and selling it across the border in Turkey on the black market (Sanger and
Davis). Other estimates project that ISIS can produce roughly 25,000-40,000 barrels of oil per
day. As a result, ISIS has quickly become one of the wealthiest terrorist organizations in history.
Like the Taliban, ISIS imposes its version of strict Islamic fundamentalist law in each
town and city it conquers. The black flag of the Islamic State is placed in public places to
symbolize the legitimacy and rule of the newly formed state. A group of ISIS members from a
religious police section in each city ensures that women wear proper attire and that businesses
stop for prayer several times a day. ISIS members facilitate market transactions like selling gas
and are present at markets. Anyone who defies or is suspected of defying their authority may be
subject to public executions or amputations, which are frequently, imposed penalties.
The military component of ISIS ranges from 20,000-31,500 fighters, according to CIA
estimates. In addition, ISIS fighters have ransacked Iraqi and Syrian weapon caches, which
included U.S. weapons, intended to help Shiites fend off extremist infantry during the 2007 Iraqi
conflict. Most alarmingly, 15,000 members of ISIS are foreign-recruited jihadis from Western
Europe, North America, and Australia, according to a CIA report largely circulated in Western
media in September 2014 (CNN). Through slickly produced video messages and an active social
media presence, members of ISIS encourage Muslims across the world to join the fight in the
Middle East. Western movement to the region started during the Syrian Civil War to fight
against the Assad regime; however, some choose to join ISIS while there. More recently, recruits
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travel through Turkey into northern Syria, now an ISIS stronghold. Nevertheless, the military
component of ISIS establishes regional credibility through its public executions, which are
purposefully captured on film and disseminated on the Internet.

Terrorizing Videos
The ISIS videos proliferating on the Web serve several functions. Decapitation and
execution videos aim to illicit public outcry and evoke fear regionally and globally. Other videos
narrated by foreign-jihadis depict ISIS as inclusive to attract more foreigners to their cause.
Lastly, another type of video functions to imitate and parody Western news organizations by
forcing an imprisoned journalist to head the ISIS’ news department. All videos include the
ominous, waving black flag in a corner of the screen. Most Westerners’ visual experience with
terrorists consisted of Bin Laden’s meager appearance, as he sat cross-legged in a cave with a
fuzzy VHS quality picture. To the contrary, ISIS videos are much more slick and meticulously
produced. They feature multiple cameras, cameras on drones for aerial shots, sharp graphics, and
excellent sound quality. Most importantly, the high-definition resolution creates a familiar
viewing experience for Westerners accustomed to digesting similarly glossy television programs
and movies. The improved quality of the videos increases the effectiveness of these campaigning
videos. ISIS seeks to project a strong image by boasting military victories and demanding hefty
ransoms with a knife in their hand. Other videos capture the decapitation of fellow Muslims,
known as apostates, those who reject ISIS, or fundamentalist Sunni and Sharia doctrine. These
visual messages intend to terrorize and shock, but also to project strength to legitimize its rule as
a state, no matter how barbaric. In addition, the glossy depiction of life in the Islamic State seeks
to recruit fellow jihadis worldwide to continue to expand the caliphate past the Levant.
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ISIS began to draw international attention with the sudden sacking of Iraq’s second
largest city, Mosul in June 2014. Some parts of the city “warmly welcomed” ISIS and viewed the
Iraqi security forces as a hostile Shi’a militia. In under a week, only 800 ISIS militants forced the
Iraqi army to flee (Frontline). ISIS videos show the explicit killings of captured Iraqi security
forces. The next month, ISIS posted videos of roughly fifty Syrian soldiers killed in battle and
some beheaded on July 25 in Raqqa (Al-Jazeera).
In response to the repeated violations of Iraqi sovereignty, President Obama launched an
airstrike campaign to ultimately “destroy and degrade” the ISIS threat. International attention
grew fervent in the summer of 2014, when ISIS, in reply, began launching jihadi videos with the
help of its propaganda machine, the Al Hayat media center. These videos threatened to kill
Western journalists if U.S. led airstrikes in the area did not cease.

First Function: ICT Killings
Captured in northwestern Syria in the Fall 2012, journalist James Foley appeared in an
orange jumpsuit in the desert in an ISIS beheading video. Foley showed little emotion and
stoically stood on his knees while an English-speaking ISIS member decried U.S. involvement in
the area. Unlike previous terrorist videos, ISIS invests time and money into high-definition
equipment and a production team to produce a video with stunning effects. The audio is
remarkably clear with multiple microphones. Visually the endless desert beyond the foreground
is especially scenic. The British-accented ISIS executioner has been nicknamed “John” by his
hostages, and the Western media gave him the nickname, “Jihad John” (UK Daily Mail). While
speaking, he wields a long blade knife. Once he attributes blame for Foley’s death squarely on
the United States, Jihad John begins the decapitation process as the camera zooms in on Foley’s
neck and quivering body. Then, there is a cut-scene and the entire execution is avoided, an
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interesting decision of self-censoring. By making the video less gruesome, ISIS hopes more
people will be able to access it. The camera slowly comes back into focus and pans to Foley
stretched out on the ground with his head on his stomach. The high degree of orchestrated
control of this video reflects ISIS’ desire to gain legitimacy via ICTs.
The second video featuring Steven Sotloff begins with a fuzzy picture of an Obama
speech artistically embedded in the video, another characteristic of a sophisticated production
team. Here, ISIS clearly attributes the execution deaths to U.S. foreign policy. The vast desert in
the foreground attempts to depict ISIS as standing out in the open and unafraid of retaliation. The
distinct differences reinforce the message ISIS wants to project their strength. More importantly,
these types of stylistic effects are more digestible for the HBO-watching American public. For
once, a terrorist organization caters to the stylistic appetites of the West by imitating their
entertainment, albeit in a chilling manner. These artistic qualities mix oddly with the horrific
message being played out on the screen that projects strength and perhaps appeals to Western
culture in hopes of recruiting more jihadis.
Aside from the widely publicized beheadings foreigners like Foley and Sotloff, ISIS
regularly uploads public executions and beheadings. They label these videos as killing religious
apostates, indicating that ISIS kills fellow Muslims more frequently than foreign prisoners. One
such heading reads, “Liquidating One of the Apostates Who Betrayed the Mujahidin,” “Soldiers
of the Nusayris in the Hands of the Islamic State” and “Harvest of the Apostates”
(jihadology.net). These videos are more brutal than the execution videos geared towards the
Western audience. A crowd of ISIS fighters imposingly stands behind the executioner, or
sometimes, they stage the killings in a public square or street. Here, ISIS projects their strength
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to the communities in which they rule. They legitimize themselves through the sword, and
extinguish opposition, or deviant religious groups through public execution.
The most recent, and most horrifying, video depicts the captured Jordanian pilot caged
and burned alive. The scene is well staged and the camera pans to reveal a gasoline drizzle that
leads past a tunnel of IS soldiers into the cage with the prisoner. The fuse line is lit and the fire
engulfs the line and moves into the cell. The camera unabashedly captures the pilot’s
excruciating death. Even worse, ISIS broadcasted this video on high-definition screens
throughout its strongholds. In Raqqa, citizens gathered around to watch the execution. This is a
purposeful campaign to legitimize their rule via strength and fear transmitted by ICTs.

The Second Function of ISIS’ videos: Imitation Games
First debuting on YouTube on September 18, 2014, former British journalist and current
ISIS detainee John Cantlie begun a video series entitled “Lend Me Your Ears” to offer a critique
of Western media and a more “accurate” depiction of events in ISIS. Unlike his fellow prisoners
who lost their lives in a horrifying decapitation, Cantlie’s life has been spared. Naturally, Cantlie
acknowledges how his work may appear feigned since he is beholden to ISIS by a gun.
Nevertheless, he claims that since his government abandoned him, he has nothing to lose and
thus contributes as the informal Western ISIS journalist. Yet Cantlie never explains specifically
why his life has been temporarily saved to be the main reporter behind this series. Instead Cantlie
in his Western-trained broadcast style offers a counter-balance to the dominant Western media:
I am going to show you the truth and systems and motivations of the Islamic State, and how
the Western media, the very organization I used to work for, can twist and manipulate that
truth for the public back home. There are two sides to every story. Think you’re getting the
whole picture? (Lend Me Your Ears, Introduction Video).
Then Cantlie alludes to how other nations have secured the release of ISIS detainees by
negotiation, and criticizes the United States and Britain, which have refused to negotiate. This
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deprecating commentary is the result of a concentrated propaganda effort to produce and control
a grand ISIS narrative that pits the hegemonic world powers against a small group of fearless
jihadis. ICTs are the mode through which this propaganda disseminates.
Donning an orange jumpsuit and appearing gaunt with spotty facial hair, Cantlie does not
yet look the part of a credible journalist. However, his bluntly honest delivery conveys sincerity
to the viewer. At this point Cantlie promises further videos, but the message is not as effective
since he admits his status as a prisoner and looks the part. However, this video sets the stage for
an onslaught of ISIS propaganda in the style of Western media, with John Cantlie emerging as
the Western mujahedeen spokesperson. The series’ ironic title “Lend Me Your Ears” alludes to
the Shakespearean play, Julius Caesar. In Mark Antony’s oration, he attempts to justify the
actions of Brutus and the assassins by “coming to bury Caesar, not praise him.” Yet by the end of
the speech the crowd turns against the conspirators and mourns Caesar. Similarly, Cantlie
appears before the camera to shift the international community’s attention against the West and
legitimize ISIS. Hence, this series of videos is clearly distinct from gruesome decapitation clips
and only improves in its quality and rhetoric.
In his second video of the “Lend me Your Ears” series, Cantlie responds to President
Obama’s September 2014 speech commemorating the 9/11 attacks and outlining the plan to
defeat ISIS. Cantlie likens U.S. involvement in the areas as the third reiteration of the Gulf War
and doubts the effectiveness of a “boots-on-the-ground” strategy led by Iraqi forces in taking
back ISIS-controlled villages and cities. Cantlie’s delivery is strong and effective, and he quotes
New York Times journalist Peter Baker, who describes the impending conflict as one of the
“bloodiest, most vicious fratricidal conflicts” (YouTube). Cantlie attacks President Obama’s
credibility in running a war against the Islamic State. His message strongly alludes to the first

Kerr 45
two arrogant wars in the Middle East and how American behavior has failed to learn from those
experiences. Cantlie’s rhetoric is not simply pro-ISIS propaganda, but more akin to an anti-war
effort. Thus, the effectiveness of the messages channeled through Cantlie as a Western journalist
is devoid of violence or ISIS atrocities, and rather focuses on a more rational viewpoint that may
resonate with liberal-minded Westerners. Here, ISIS effectively harnesses the power of videosharing sites to reach an audience willing to click on a video—initially out of concern for
Cantlie, but then perhaps becoming more sympathetic as a result of watching the “Lend Me Your
Ears” series.
In episode four, Cantlie again sets out to counter Western media that promotes another
“unwinnable” war in the Middle East. Again, Cantlie sits in his orange jumpsuit with a black
backdrop and appeals to the indifference of the Western population that is more concerned about
the economy than another drawn-out war in the Middle East.
They say that people have short memories, but the ink has not even yet dried on the
written orders to pull out of Afghanistan. Yet here we are gearing up for Gulf War
3…and another complex geo-political war in a far away country, that does not concern
them, is of little interest. And yet at the first sniff of something they don’t like, the
American war-machine springs to life, whipped along by the Western media as usual.
Cantlie cites the August 7th decision by Obama to launch airstrikes as opportunistic. The
justification for protecting religious minorities, specifically, the Yazidis, is inconsistent with
U.S.’ refusal to intervene in other grave crimes like, the Assad regime’s use of chemical weapons
in August 2013, argues Cantlie. The video production is improved in this video with pans to
pictures that reinforce Cantlie’s message, like a row of white-wrapped corpses from a recent
airstrike. Episode four’s overall propagandist message digs at the futility of the two failed wars
and condemns the Western media for whipping up support for another unwinnable, costly war.
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Episode 5, broadcasted on November 2, 2014, begins with the usual refrain from Cantlie,
describing himself as “the British citizen abandoned by my own government and a prisoner of
the Islamic State for nearly two years.” Cantlie addresses the executions of his peer journalists by
first emphasizing that the community of prisoners was treated well and that “it wasn’t a bad life.”
Cantlie remarks how Spanish and French journalists were freed when their governments met
certain conditions. Cantlie cites e-mails from American families and explains how the U.S.
government did “absolutely nothing” to secure the release of its citizen-journalists. Cantlie
argues that the mujahedeen have repeatedly said that Western governments do not care about us.
Episode 6 continues the narrative of the forgotten journalists and elaborates on the failed
rescue attempt by U.S. forces on July 4, 2014. Cantlie laments that the recent exchange of
prisoners to secure one U.S. soldier, Bowe Berghdal, is deemed more important than saving six
civilians. Cantlie says “they were left to die” due to the government’s refusal to negotiate their
release. The overall message of the video is that their lives were politically expendable and their
governments abandoned them, and then used their executions as a means to launch the coalition.
Cantlie forcefully states, “I will continue to speak out against this military action and the
deceitful arrogance of these governments for as long as the mujahedeen allow me to live.”
Although Cantlie’s rhetoric is well written and rehearsed, these videos do not best utilize
his skills as a Western media correspondent, until he appears in three media-styled reports in
Mosul, Kobane, and Halab. The Al-Hayat media center precisely imitates the style of Western
programs, like CNN, creating a production that uses high-definition quality and graphics.
Cantlie’s reports feature him walking through cities controlled by ISIS. In one episode entitled
“Inside Halab” Cantlie walks among the rubble, but emphasizes the prosperity of the city due to
ISIS control in a twelve-minute slickly produced segment: “Driving into Halab, one can truly
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appreciate, firsthand, the huge swaths of land liberated and controlled by the mujahidin” (AlHayat Media Center). These comments, along with the cable-new graphics, are ISIS’ attempts to
prove its statehood. It does not see itself as merely an organization, but as a state that holds
territory and performs state function. In the middle of the segment, Cantlie acts like a warreporter, insisting that drones had just bombed a market. Although it is difficult to authenticate
the footage, the marketplace does look damaged—but that could have been staged. Nevertheless,
Cantlie describes the pandemonium and runs to cover. In these reports, ISIS directs ICTs as a
persuasive force to legitimize their rule and mollify it through Cantile’s voice to the global
audience.
Lastly, ISIS uses its video production team to exhort its “humanitarian” and state actions
to the regional. One video shows construction equipment paving over dirt to re-make a road
(“Services Authority: Repairing and Opening a Road in the Village of al-‘Abbāsīyyah –
Wilāyat al-Khayr”). Another video boasts the new school curriculum imposed by the Islamic
State, yet all the students are boys indicating the suppression of girls’ rights to receive an
education (“Reopening Schools with the New Curriculum – Wilāyat al-Khayr”). These videos
attempt to counter the Western impression of the Islamic State as a tyrannical rule. By showing
humane conditions, ISIS seeks to legitimize their rule to the surrounding area by broadcasting
such videos only in Arabic.

The Third Function of ISIS’ Videos: International Recruitment
Like grassroots movements augmented by the power ICTs, ISIS’ propaganda department
harnesses the Web to blast its messages, both violent and informative, across the world in hopes
of recruiting more followers to commit Jihad in the Levant and the West. ISIS has gained the
attention of Western governments and the people of these nations who have heeded the call.
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Attacks in Ottawa, and Paris were influenced by ISIS propaganda facilitated by Jihadi postings
on the Web.
On January 10, 2015, the Islamic State released a collection of memoir-styled videos of
one of the French gunman, Amedy Coulibaly. Sitting underneath the ISIS’ black flag and a
weapon by his side, Coulibaly dons militant fatigues while pledging his allegiance and devotion
to ISIS. The publication of these posthumous videos signifies the effectiveness of the ISIS’
media in recruiting followers who not only perpetrate acts of violence, but carefully document
their devotion to the ISIS cause before the suicidal mission.
In October 2014 two separate lone wolf attacks terrorized Ottawa and Canada. Prime
Minister Stephen Harper emphasized that although the attacks were separate, they were both
inspired by ISIS (CBC News). After the attacks a Canadian ISIS member, John Maguire,
encouraged more lone-wolf styled attacks in his home country (ISIS video). In another jihadi
video, another Canadian Andrè Poulin mentioned that he played hockey as child growing up in
Canada, but ultimately heeded the call to fight for ISIS (CBC News). While in the U.S., ISIS
members have also turned up in the Middle East yet no U.S. citizen has executed an ISIS
sponsored attack on U.S. soil. However, thirty-three-year-old Douglas McAuthur McCain
traveled to Syria to fight for ISIS and died in action (Washington Post). This marks the first
known American citizen killed fighting for ISIS. In his social media history McCain expressed
violent thoughts and sincere interest in joining ISIS:
“The ‘soldiers of Allah’ are ‘coming back.” “I will be joining you guys soon.” “I’m with
brothers now,” “It takes a warrior to understand a warrior. Pray for ISIS.”
Individual actors, like McCain, frighten Western nations not just because they flee to the Middle
East and fight for ISIS, but because they have the passport to return domestically, there is a

Kerr 49
greater potential for a domestic terrorist attack. Although McCain converted to Islam years
before he went to fight for ISIS, he became radicalized by trips abroad and expressed his jihadi
beliefs on social media. Again, this fact reiterates that ICTs have no ideological preference since
they are tools.
Many other stories have emerged of young people attempting to join ISIS. 19-year-old
Mohammed Hamzah Khan was caught trying to flee to for ISIS ground via Istanbul with his
younger brother and sister. Authorities charged Khan with “attempting to provide material
support to a foreign terrorist organization,” (Washington Post). The Khan siblings had been
persuaded to join ISIS through twitter exchanges with members. More shocking, the Khan
daughter tweeted ISIS propaganda documentaries that featured gruesome violence and
decapitations (Washington Post). Some have labeled this “bedroom jihad,” ISIS propaganda
disseminated on the Web that targets young people to join their cause. All one needs is an
Internet connection facilitated through a computer, or a smart phone to become attracted to the
message echoed by newly converted Western jihadis fighting in the Levant. U.S. authorities
detained, “at least 15 U.S. citizens—nine of them female” who attempted to join ISIS
(Washington Post). This larger trend concerns Western governments who have enhanced efforts
to monitor suspicious flying activity, especially those traveling to Turkey, the unofficial front
door to the ISIS ranks.
Similarly, the U.K. faces a more pronounced “bedroom jihad” threat due the significant
Muslim population in England. ISIS propaganda videos hope to attract more fighters for their
cause. In order to stop the flood of British Muslims fleeing to fight, the British government set
up a new program, “Prevent”, to counter the Internet radicalization of its citizens. Sir Peter Fahy
expresses concern over ICTs:
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I think the big concern about the current situation is just a huge amount of material[,]
which is available on social media, in the various publications and the various videos…
You’ve got, you know, a person who’s identifiably British who’s gone out there and is
absolutely using social media to be able to communicate directly into your son or
daughter’s bedroom…
The increased perceived threat by ICTs warrants the intrusion of the mass collection of ICT data
in the United States and Britain. Like China, the effects of ICTs—whether democratizing, or
not—are potentially destabilizing. However, the Western recourse for dealing with these
problems is to control more data; a technological fix that is not applicable to this situation. ICTs
are not fallible because they are tools. There are ways to counter youth disillusionment that
tackle the core, socio-political grievances; expanding an already invasive electronic dragnet
ignores the root, societal problems.

ISIS on Twitter: Western Intelligence Agencies’ Response
After Fahy’s outcry on “60 Minutes,” Robert Hannigan, the head of the British
intelligence surveillance agency GCHQ, attributed blame to Western media companies for
enabling the spreading of ISIS propaganda through their social media services. Hannigan
correctly addresses the difference between ISIS and al-Qaeda in which the former uses the “web
as a noisy channel in which to promote itself and radicalize new recruits,” and the latter lurked in
the dark spaces of the Internet without massive digital mobilization (Hannigan’s Open Letter).
For instance, ISIS commonly hijacks popular twitter hash tags like #WorldCup2014 to get their
message to a much wider audience rather than disseminating material in the dark, less-populated
web. However, Hannigan does not realize that Twitter, a technological medium that is open to
both positive and nefarious uses, cannot control what its user say, especially several thousands of
them. Hannigan does not understand the problem that ISIS “bedroom jihad” propaganda is nearly
unstoppable due to the myriad of third-party sites that launch their message via ICTs. As Lessig

Kerr 51
notes, there is tradeoff, or compromise when allowing technologies to flourish since dissidents in
authoritarian nations can use them, but also can “Al-Qaeda” (Lessig, 225). To adapt the quote
this study, so can ISIS harness the power of ICTs to control its image to evoke fear and earn
legitimacy as a means of consolidating power.
Nevertheless, Twitter and other companies understand the real-world implication of
graphic tweets and suspend ISIS-supporting accounts in violation of its terms of service. Yet
Twitter faces logistical challenges in banning accounts at the same pace they are recreated. From
September to December 2014, Twitter suspended a minimum for 1000 ISIS-supporting accounts
that yielded high traffic (Brookings Research). Yet, during this period, Berger estimates that ISIS
supporters used at least 46,000 Twitter accounts (Brookings). In 2011, ISIS affiliates began
creating accounts, totaling only 1,064 (Brookings). In 2012 the accounts created figure increased
to 2,380 and almost doubled in 2013 to 4,378. In 2014 the number of pro-ISIS Twitter accounts
rose astronomically to 11,902, as the group became more infamously known. The Tweets per
day figures explain how despite a finite amount of accounts, ISIS supporters blast Twitter with
“concentrated bursts of high volume” that establishes a digital presence on social networking
sites (Brookings). The brazen presence of ISIS on Twitter debunks the cyber-utopian view of
ICTs, which includes social networking sites, as innately pro-democratizing. Rather, the ISIS
example proves that people and culture shape how technology is used. ISIS uses Twitter to gain
global consciousness and attract followers via its fast-acting, digital propaganda apparatus, a feat
that was impossible before the emergence of ICTs.
Yet some cyber activists, ranging from individuals to the cyber-hacktivist group,
Anonymous, survey Twitter for pro-ISIS Twitter accounts to report to Twitter for suspension.
One activist, XRSone, released a roster of 26,382 accounts to be deactivated by Twitter
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(Gladstone). Additionally, J.M. Berger, who analyzes ISIS’ Twitter use, doubts the effectiveness
of such lists (Gladstone). Due to the anonymity of the Web, it is difficult to pinpoint the number
of pro-ISIS accounts, but the scholarly estimate ranges from 46,000 to 70,000. Recently, the New
York Times estimates that the vast ISIS’ network carries roughly 500 million messages a day in
various languages (Gladstone). Almost one in five ISIS supporters on Twitter are Englishspeaking, whereas three quarters select Arabic (Brookings).
Hannigan laments the growing encryption procedures used by Western technology
companies that he says enables ISIS to communicate easier and without being identified. After
the Edward Snowden NSA revelations, the Western public lobbied for better encryption tools to
protect their privacy and communications against pervasive surveillance intelligence agencies,
not to protect a small portion of terrorists. Again, the innate design of ICTs as a tool allows the
equal potential for a vibrant digital civil society, or terrorist propaganda. Here, Hannigan
wrongly accuses such innovations, labeled “Snowden approved,” as detrimental to the counterterrorism effort and even enabling and perpetuating ISIS’ online reach (Hannigan’s Open Letter).
Hannigan essentially claims that improving privacy is directly correlated to enabling ISIS
operatives to enjoy the same benefits that facilitate terrorist missions and international
recruitment. Again framing the problem of ISIS’ use of ICTs as the problem of technology
companies ignores that ICTs are tools, open to both good and nefarious purposes. Steps can be
made to eliminate pro-ISIS tweets; however, the proposed de-encryption of devices affects all
users, not just the fraction that use anonymity to design attacks.

Conclusion
To use Morozov’s term, ISIS created a “Spinternet”—a Web with little censorship but
lots of spin and propaganda that reinforces their ideological supremacy as a byproduct of open-
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ended nature of the Web (117). The Islamic State artfully uses sophisticated equipment to create
visual productions and disseminates them using the power of the Web, not solely Western social
media companies. ISIS lacks the censorship and surveillance techniques, and rather utilizes ICTs
as a Spinternet as evident in the rampant pro-ISIS tweets. Additionally, the video messages range
enormously; from gruesome decapitations to state building exercises to a Western British accent
reporting in a pro-ISIS slant in major cities. Yet all of these ICT examples function to propagate
and reinforce its newfound power. ISIS is revolutionary because they are the first group to
successfully harness the diverse uses of media and advance their multi-faceted agenda. ISIS
physically launched an ground campaign with remarkable success; however, it can be argued that
the Islamic State has successfully infiltrated the bedrooms of perhaps disillusioned Western
youth and convinced them to abandon their Western comforts for a life governed by sharia law
and on the frontlines of an intensifying religious-political war. In this context, the costs of ICTs
allows for like-minded individuals, irrespective of their ideology, to connect and share ghastly
videos. Unlike the repression of ICTs in China, in self-governing areas like ISIS, it is difficult for
foreign nations, like Britain, to control how ICTs are used. However, it is certain that ISIS
controls and increases its image via ICTs.
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Chapter 4: Egyptian Grassroots ICTs and State Repression
Two transformative events powered by technology in 2011—the Arab Spring and
Occupy Wall Street. Accordingly, Time Magazine named the Person of the Year “The Protestor.”
In 2015’s hindsight, what is the legacy of these movements, and how has technology evolved in
similar and different political settings?

Grassroots Mobilization
In 2011, the Arab Spring uprisings consisted of spontaneous popular mass movements,
which opposed traditional dictatorships ranging from North Africa through the Middle East.
Although the roots of the unrest lie in Tunisia, the focus of this chapter is on Egypt’s grassroots
mobilization online and in the streets that forced President Hosni Mubarak to resign. The date
January 25, 2011, resonates in the minds of Egyptians as the start of the mass protests. Hundreds
of thousands of protestors packed Tahrir Square, a sight resembling the mass demonstrations in
Tiananmen Square in China in 1989. Unlike that example, political activists in Egypt were
equipped with ICTs that facilitated the mass mobilization that eventually forced Mubarak to step
down from power.
How much of a role did ICTs play in the uprising; was this a technological revolution?
And, four years later, how has Egypt changed since the initial emergence of political change?

Is Egypt different than Iran?
In 2010, Evgeny Morozov scoffed at the notion of the supposed democratizing power of
the Web by marshaling evidence of how authoritarian regimes coopt the web into a more
sophisticated power apparatus. The failed Green Movement in Iran in 2009 was his introductory
example of what he called cyber-utopianism; an unrealistic and naïve belief in the ability of the
Internet and social media to impact political power. In addition, the Chinese example fits
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Morozov’s model as a state that failed to sufficiently liberalize with the advent of the Web. The
CCP presides over a local democratic façade of the Internet, while strictly forbidding any threat
to its power through an overbearing censorship task force that suppresses negative comments.
However, the uprisings in Egypt in 2011 present a formidable challenge to Morozov’s criticisms
of cyber-utopianism, as social protest powered through traditional and Internet-enabled methods
of organizing led to political change.

ICTs: are they Weapons of the Weak?
In Manuel Castells’ book Networks of Outrage and Hope: Social Movements in the
Internet Age, a heightened importance is placed on the development of ICTs and how it improves
the protest capabilities of the politically weak. More specifically, Castells cites the infrastructure
of the Internet as a revolutionizing form of horizontal communication that does not rely on
traditional vertical forms of communication made possible by media moguls (15). As a result, the
Internet gives birth to the idea of mass self-communication: “the use of the Internet and wireless
networks as platforms of digital communication” (6). This mass self-communication
development provides “the technological platform for the construction of the autonomy of the
social actor, be it individual or collective vis-à-vis the institutions of society” (7). According to
Castells, “This is why governments are afraid of the Internet…” this sort of communication
cannot be physically tracked or predicted as it were before the digital age (7). Indeed, the
Mubarak regime was caught off-guard by the savvy use of technology, and perhaps regrettably
miscalculated the power of ICTs in organizing more widely attended protests. The political
prowess exhibited by the combination of ICTs paired with a disgruntled citizenry poses a threat
to authoritarian regimes with and without a democratic history; however, going forward, these
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repressive crackdowns on ICTs and in the street incentivize authoritarian responses, and
debatably encourage a wave of control rather than granting liberalizing freedoms.

An Internet Revolution?
Political unrest began between January 17th and 20th when at least five Egyptians
attempted self-immolation in front of public buildings in Cairo (Middle East in Focus, 354).
Shortly after, an organized social media presence prepared for a nationwide day of protest on
January 25th (Middle East in Focus, 354). The spirit of the Arab Spring inspired millions of
Egyptians to protest in the streets and call for the resignation of President Mubarak in Cairo’s
Tahrir Square but also throughout the country. On January 28th, Mubarak’s government
disconnected the nation from the Internet in hopes of quelling unrest triggered by social media
organizing (Howard 21). Despite the outage, the protests persisted while Egypt’s economy and
government agencies’ productivity tumbled due to the loss of Internet access from the four-day
blackout. Mubarak’s plan called for deliberate chaos; he ordered ATMs and stores to not be
resupplied while arranging curfews (Middle East in Focus, 356). In order to restore order and relegitimize his rule, Mubarak deployed prisoners and thugs to thwart the protesters (356). Yet,
despite several attempted compromises, including dissolving his cabinet and agreeing to not run
for reelection, Mubarak at last relinquished power on February 11, 2011, which eventually set
the course for democratic elections in the next few months.
The Arab Spring in Egypt spread more quickly with a wide base of mobile phone users
and the facilitation of online networking that could rapidly organize masses of people in public
spaces. Philip Howard and Muzammil Hussain argue that nations without this “civil society with
digital scaffolding are much less likely to experience popular movements for democracy than are
countries with such an infrastructure” (123). Howard characterizes this moment as Democracy’s
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Fourth Wave in accordance with Samuel Huntington’s democracy wave theory. Digital tools
alter the balance of power between the authoritarian regime and its citizens, yet unfortunately it
mostly sways to the benefit of the regime in power. The hardened military rule established in the
wake of Mubarak questions ICT effectiveness.

Pre-2011: Constructing a Digital Civil Society
In his introduction to The Digital Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy (2010),
Howard forebodingly investigates how the Internet mixes with the Muslim world, socially and
politically. With lowering economic costs, the mass use of the Internet is affordable and easily
accessible at home, work, and public libraries and cyber cafes (31). ICTs in Howard’s words,
“enable both the production and consumption of political culture” and disseminate
communications between networks (31). Another reason for mass adoption of the Internet is that
governments, like China, invest into Internet infrastructure to encourage business modernization.
To avoid modernization for fear of digital reprisal was a key concern in China, which the party
dealt with by owning the physical ICT infrastructure. In Egypt, however, much of the
infrastructure of the Internet was provided by Western companies. From the outset, Egypt never
had full control of what would later turn out to be a major liberalizing force. Lastly, Howard
cites the Internet as a convenient information technology to discuss culture, politics and share
grievances and aspirations (32). In Egypt this phenomenon is best supported by the surge of the
Egyptian blogosphere. Moreover, combined with this willingness to contribute to once improper
behavior—to discuss and question government—the Internet acts as “crucial democratic
information infrastructure” that dramatically empowers a citizen with an internet-connected
smart phone that can share information rapidly and widely (Howard Digital Origins, 108). This
is when Egyptian citizens become “citizen-journalist” at the point when they can reach out to
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other concerned citizens and share views and evidence of governmental corruption (Howard,
112). Out of these early channels a mass consensus grew amongst digitally connected Egyptians.
In opposition to this optimism, Howard stresses how even more democratic nations
contract security services to harass bloggers, since they raise collective consciousness with
breaking news stories and pictures and videos as objective evidence (Howard Digital Origins,
117). Before the Arab Spring, Egypt already boasted a record of imprisoning bloggers, by
identifying them as political oppressors (Howard, 117). Howard dutifully notes the changing
attitudes of the public towards the Internet as a news-source that is more reliable than traditional
information gathering like state-backed print, television and radio-mass media (129). “Even
though a particular autocratic state may not have the tradition of free speech or strong legal
institutions for promoting such conduct, new media technologies are serving the conduit for
cultural content that promotes such values” (129). Contrary to state-media, ICTs’ counter
establishment nature challenges the political insufficiencies of traditional types of less dynamic
media.

Information Infrastructure
In chapter 5, “Civil Society and System of Political Communication,” Howard describes
the Internet as an “invaluable logistical tool for organization and communication for civil society
groups” and lauds its information infrastructure independent of the state (132). Online bulletin
boards and chat rooms exercise virtual free speech in typically authoritarian Muslim nations
(133). Howard enriches his definition of civil society, “as a crucial part of all democracies” and
as “constituted by a plurality of groups representing diverse perspectives and promoting those
perspectives through communications media and cultural institutions” (133). The falling costs of
Internet access explain how civil society grows rapidly online (140). “Internet access has vastly
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improved the quality and quantity of informational resources available in public and national
libraries” (144). Howard makes the prophetic statement that the Web does not only contain civic
activism, popular protest, and political opposition, “but that the Internet is the means by which
social movements have formed” (146). ICTs undoubtedly improve the cohesion and impact of
social movements compared to an earlier, pre-ICT era (147). Castells similarly underlines
Howard and Hussain’s emphasis on digital networks that facilitated civic leaders’ protests (104).
Castells argues that what makes the Arab Spring unique is its spontaneous non-traditional
mobilization separate from formal organizations, which had been delegitimized in the eyes of the
young participants by self-censorship and suppression during the Mubarak years (106).

Democratization Theory—Technology Diffusion
These points aggregated from Howard’s pre-Arab Spring book clearly identify the
growth in civil society thanks to technology diffusion. In 2013, Howard and Hussain determine
ICTs as a causal role in the sociopolitical movements, and as a vital in the Egyptian example.
Still, Howard concedes that there is a dark side of the Web—“video clips of bombings,
beheadings, [on the Internet]”—without quantifying the effects this may have on the causal role
of netizens who may be more hesitant to post and share information once the government
responds brutally, as in the case in Iran in 2009 (134). Also, Howard recognizes the authoritarian
regime’s own digital tools to constrain and crush digital dissent with censorship and pursuit of a
“cultural management” agenda (135 and 147). Yet, what this critique does not account for is the
assumed automatic politicization of users on the Web and the cumulative impact of relentless
authoritarian pressure that results in a pacified citizenry online and off. Howard devotes many
pages to describing censorship methods and the multiple choke points and filtering options of the
information networks (171). Yet this sort of digital repression works against ICTs in the long run
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since ICTs generate data-tracking information that helps the regime detain and suppress
bloggers. While Mubarak was being overthrown, fear in Egypt temporarily subsided until the
military’s use of digital and physical repression re-evoked fear that in turn minimized the
liberalizing effects of ICTs.

Digital Dissent
Before the Arab Spring could take place, an alternate space of dissent was created online
for netizens under non-democratic regimes, like Egypt’s. Yet, Howard concedes that increased
political communication does not necessarily translate into governments transitioning into
democracy immediately, like Egypt (195). Rather this digital transition lessens the authoritarian
sting allegedly; Mubarak stepped down, and Morsi too, crumbled under popular pressure and
military interference. Howard’s reasoning is logical—although citizens are not yet at the ballot
boxes—a robust online discourse of politics increases the political consciousness in nations
accustomed to limited public discussion. Over time, citizens can extract limited concessions from
wary authoritarian regimes. After Mubarak, the opening of the political sphere led to an
increased popularity for once “illegal” political groups, like the Muslim Brotherhood (195).
As Howard states, the Web provided an autonomous and anonymous space unparalleled
in Egyptian civil discourse. As I alluded to in the first chapter, Howard labels the burgeoning
social media sites online as the digital scaffolding in which civil society can grow online (44).
Castells similarly remarks that, “[the] Internet and mobile phone networks are not simply tools,
but organizational forms, cultural expression and specific platforms for political autonomy”
(103). Even under government censorship, Egyptian bloggers used the platform of the web to
vocalize their grievances online. More importantly, these dissidents enjoyed the anonymity of the
web that created “alternate newscasts and building spaces” where publication of such dissent is
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not attached to any actual name (Howard and Hussain Democracy’s Fourth Wave, 38). Howard
argues that in this digital realm a civil society emerged to debate contentious issues that were not
allowed in the public square (38). Thus, the Internet social networks converged with the urban
networks at the crossroads of symbolic public power, in the squares for open protest (Castells,
81).
To avoid IP tracking, the servers for these websites were located outside the jurisdiction
of Egypt and thus could not be taken down, unless all Internet communications were
disconnected. An active online civil society, Howard boldly claims, “is both a necessary and
sufficient cause of transitions out of authoritarianism” (197). It follows then that with
technological diffusion, a vibrant virtual space can achieve political outcomes (198). Irrespective
of the rate of change, ICTs transform the way citizens receive information while opening up
channels for political discourse—a clear information improvement over broadcast state media
(199). Howard concludes Digital Origins in Barrington Moore’s advice that there is not a
singular path to democracy. However, Howard’s work concludes that there is a strong trend and
causal relationship between technology diffusion and democratic transitions (200). Thus the
democratization pathway now is undeniably digital according to Howard, but this may overemphasize and underestimate existent, alternative political opposition networks that initiated the
uprising. Moreover, even after the multiple political upheavals, Egyptian repression continues in
the streets and through ICTs because there was never a complete transition out of
authoritarianism in Egypt.

ICTs in the Arab Spring
The Egyptian regime responded to the increased public sphere online by blocking access
to social media sites like Twitter and Facebook occasionally in the years leading up to the Arab
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Spring. This sporadic behavior shows that regimes were worried about ICTs before their massive
adoption and that authoritarian states struggled to find a way to choke off democratic thought
without appearing too harsh. In other words, unlike China, Egypt failed at networked
authoritarianism. In 2008 Tunisia blocked Facebook for a month (Howard 39). In 2011, a
protestor in Tunisia lauded Facebook, ““Facebook is pretty much the GPS for this
revolution…Without the street there’s no revolution, but add Facebook to the street and you get
real potential” (Streetbook).	
  Undoubtedly the regimes feared this ease of communication spurred
by these platforms and their ability to form bonds outside of one’s typical circle of friends—and
to engage in discourse with similarly concerned citizens (Howard Digital Origins, 39).
Howard considers Wael Ghonim, the Google regional executive, as instrumental to the
social networking uprising in Egypt. Ghonim created the “We are all Khaled Said” group on
Facebook, which organized a mass amount of people to the streets on January 25th. The virtual
group memorialized the blogger beaten to death in the streets of Alexandria in June 2010. In the
Iranian Green Movement, the death of a young protesting girl was memorialized to catalyze
collective action (Howard Digital Origins, 23). This large social network revolutionized the idea
of civil organization and provided a means for mass civil disobedience manifested in the public
gatherings in Tahrir Square (Howard Digital Origins, 22). Similar circumstances emerged from
the street vendor, Mohamed Bouazizi, who lit himself on fire (Howard Digital Origins, 18). His
digital memorialization sparked unrest in Tunisia in December 2010, which shortly spread to
Egypt in January 2011.

Cyber-Utopianism and Digital Repression in Egypt Post-Arab Spring
In Tunisia social media networks helped with twenty-percent of the population with
accounts, but nearly everyone had a cell phone, again reinforcing digital tools that are not
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necessarily the Internet (Howard Digital Origins, 19). Similarly, virtually all Egyptians
possessed phones, hence SMS messaging established networks for “collective action and a
collective goal—to depose their despot” (Howard Digital Origins, 19). Uploading real-time
images to social networks immobilized security forces’ reaction to mass protests. When videos
captured police brutality at the protests, YouTube allowed for the “carnage” to be uploaded. This
user-driven ability had local, regional, and global ramifications. Castells adds how the Tunisia
example instilled hope into the Egyptian protests:
Tunisia epitomized the hope for change. It showed that it was possible to topple a wellentrenched regime if everybody would come together and fight uncompromisingly, to the end,
regardless of the risks. The Internet provided the safe space where networks of outrage and hope
connected (81).

The spotlight on Mubarak became brighter and the level of collective action strengthened at all
these different levels. Yet, how well-entrenched was a Mubarak regime that did not have a
definite plan on how to react to the growing digital unrest? Moreover, the military takeover
arguably enhanced the state’s ability to filter and control information over the web. According to
Reporters Without Borders, the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) that filled the
political power vacuum after Mubarak’s abdication, practices censorship and intimidation. In
military courts, journalists and bloggers were sentenced to years in jail for “insulting the armed
forces” (Reporters Without Borders). Protests remerged later in 2011 against the harsh military
rule. Again, bloggers were targeted and assaulted, one blogger; Malek Mostafa lost an eye when
security forces forcibly dispersed the crowds in Tahrir Square.
Although the Internet may have seemed like a safe space from Castells’ point of view in
2011 and 2012, the current regime in Egypt cracks down on ICTs. Again the government warns
users of social media, “that they could be arrested for inciting violence through their posts, which
were being tracked by the state” (Al-Jazeera). This threatens the civic duty each blogger and
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journalist performs when they risk their lives while criticizing the government online in a
traceable form. The persistence of this hostile atmosphere towards bloggers and journalists
persists despite these uprisings. This reinforces that what occurred after these popular mass
movements was not an actual revolution but a symbolic sacrifice of a figurehead.
Western technology companies often enable authoritarian regimes to purchase devices
that “restrict the flow of information” (Howard Digital Origins, 173). The example of the Arab
Spring encourages all authoritarian regimes to stock up on such censorship and surveilling
equipment necessary to impede grassroots movements online. When online news stories are
trending or “go viral,” they signal to the regime a rising challenge to its power. In this sense,
monitoring the ICTs helps authoritarian regimes anticipate and react to festering insurrections. In
fact, Mubarak was able to attempt to shut down the Internet by asking British-based Vodafone to
disconnect Egypt’s phone and Internet service and bought surveillance technology from an
American company, Narus (Democracy Now). The product called “Deep Packet Inspection”
allows the telecommunications companies in Egypt to open up online communications and track
dissident behavior and tag their geographic location (Democracy Now). The Iranian
Revolutionary Guard stifled its own social insurrection in 2009 after purchasing systems from
Nokia Siemens.
The result of this process of building up a vibrant civil society launched a massive protest
in Egypt roughly estimated at over 10 million people, over a thousand casualties, and thousands
more injured (Howard, 9). In addition, over 12,000 people were arrested before Mubarak’s
thirty-year regime ended (Howard and Hussain, Democracy’s Fourth Wave, 9). In the cases of
Egypt and Tunisia, both dictators conceded to the public demands. Yet the experiences in
Bahrain and Iran were successfully impeded, whereas in Libya and Syria protests and
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government reached a political impasse (26). Like Howard says, digital media can promote
democratization, but it is by no means the sole causal factor. Demands for justice and
government accountability are prominent amidst the organizers of the mass movements, but
more generally protesters in Tahrir Square demanded “bread and dignity” (Zurayk and Gough,
107). Thus, Howard resists the media’s call to label these social movements as strictly “Twitter
or Facebook Revolutions;” rather, “technology tools and the social actors who use them,
together, make or suppress political uprising” (31).

Overlooking ICTs
The over-glorification of ICTs blurs the role of existent alternative political oppositions
that facilitated the coordination beyond the logistical sharing that ICTs facilitated. The mixing of
rival soccer fan groups marks a unity that was rooted in political opposition and amplified by
ICTs. The Muslim Brotherhood has been a consistent political alternative despite its subordinate
position during Mubarak’s dictatorship. “The Ultras, [a group of soccer fan clubs] fought battles,
they understood organization, they understood logistics and they understood fighting a street
battle with the police…And in that sense they played a very key role in breaking the barrier of
fear” (Pollock). The ICTs democratizing effects can be channeled to bring together separate
groups. But, beyond the act of coordination, ICTs do little to stem military repression. In fact, the
manipulation of ICTs leads to the detainment of bloggers (Pollock).
The grassroots mobilization on the Web was initially sparked by the anonymity on online
networks. Furthermore, online activists reveled in these digital shadows by posting information
critical of the government without their names attached (Howard and Hussain, 38). The platform
of the Internet and information technologies added a weapon to the grassroots movement in
Egypt. Mubarak fumbled the problem; when he shut down the Internet, he only disabled
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broadband connections, not satellite connections (Howard and Hussain, 41). Egypt’s example
may be a case of an ineffective, antiquated regime flailing to become sophisticated digital
repressors. If this hypothesis holds true, then the future for democratization via technology
diffusion in other authoritarian regimes may be doomed. Moreover, Egypt is not a transferable
example because military rule continues repression despite the widespread use of ICTs. Despite
technological diffusion that prompted the initial uprisings in 2011 digital civil society has been
effectively constrained by an authoritarian government equipped with sophisticated censorship,
surveillance tools and classic repression methods.

Continued Military Repression in a Tightly Controlled ICT State
In the aftermath of Mubarak’s resignation in late 2011, life in Egypt was the same
politically and even more chaotic. Howard claims that technologies and actors who use them can
“make or suppress political uprising” (37). In light of the political fragmentation of Egyptian
society between secular democrats and the Islamic Brotherhood and persistence of repressive
military rule, the situation appears more alarmingly like the latter than the former. Despite the
process of parliamentary elections that consolidated party formation and continued protest
against military rule, created an atmosphere of, “the bizarre feeling of status quo minus the
stability” (Middle East in Focus, 357). Violent clashes with military personnel did not end once
Mubarak resigned; they continue to protect their power with repression and ICT manipulation.
Additionally, the mass mobilization of various groups do not share the same agenda, and no
amount of ICTs could change this inherent political problem.
In the aftermath of the Mubarak regime, the government increased content filtering
according the Internet Monitor, a tool from the Berkman Center in Harvard that analyses online
content and activity globally. Furthermore, the regime continues to temporarily block sites like
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Facebook, Twitter, and Bambuser, while also physically arresting bloggers and human rights
activists. Aside from digital repression, military rule in Egypt has resulted in dissent repression
via prolonged detainment, excessive mass prison sentences, and murder. After the Morsi removal
in July 2013 the Egyptian military reinforced its rule by “methodically” firing live ammunition in
crowds of demonstrators opposed to the Morsi overthrow In August 2014, Human Rights Watch
released its findings:
The systematic and widespread killing of at least 1,150 demonstrators by Egyptian
security forces in July and August 2013 probably amounts to crimes against humanity,
Human Rights Watch said today in a report based on a year-long investigation. In the
August 14 dispersal of the Rab’a al-Adawiya sit-in alone, security forces, following a
plan that envisioned several thousand deaths, killed a minimum of 817 people and more
likely at least 1,000.
When compared against the harsh realities of political control, ICTs shaken regime power and
cause it to repress brutally to negate any ICT liberalization. Largely peaceful protests at Rab’a alAdawiya Square for over a month violently ended on August 14 with mass casualties. Kenneth
Roth, the executive director of Human Rights Watch says:
“In Rab'a Square, Egyptian security forces carried out one of the world’s largest killings
of demonstrators in a single day in recent history…This wasn’t merely a case of
excessive force or poor training. It was a violent crackdown planned at the highest levels
of the Egyptian government. Many of the same officials are still in power in Egypt, and
have a lot to answer for.”
Roth’s comments make it clear to what lengthens the military regime will go to reinforce its
power through violence. Egypt in 2015 is more chaotic than 2011 thanks to ICTs and the threat
of liberalization that solidifies regime repression.

Conclusion: Repression and ICTs
Castells insists personal networks established online thrive off of people seeing other
people organize and protest. These actions are linked to their online social persona that bears
their actual name. Hence Castells writes, “The key to the success of an SNS [social networking
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sites] is not anonymity, but on the contrary, self-presentation of a real person connecting to real
persons” (232). However, the crackdown on said brave bloggers and social networkers presents a
challenge for a persistent, viable digital civil society. The continuous political unrest blurs any
consensus once built by disposing of Mubarak. Furthermore, the overthrowing of the
democratically elected Morsi increases instability and the repressive apparatus of the military
encourages fear and complicity online.
Despite the Egyptians’ proclivity to mobilize in mass numbers quickly, this ability is
minimized when its general consensus is reversed several months later in a cyclical basis. The
unrest of the Egyptian political system is the perpetual miscommunication between leadership
and the people. No amount of tweeting or blogging can circumvent this core governmental
problem. This issue manifests itself in the arduous task of drafting a constitution that strikes a
balance between Islamic beliefs and constitutional law. This is not to say that the ousting of
Mubarak, and latter Morsi, was for nothing. Revolution is a bloody mess that takes time to build
consensus; according to Robert Bowker in 2013, “a populist, chaotic political period lies ahead,
with elements of xenophobia even closer to the surface of political discourse than during the
Mubarak era” (591). The Arab Spring proves that ICT are a beneficial tool to the mass citizenry
when bringing down an authoritarian regime that does not adequately contain the liberalizing
effects of ICTs. The most significant lesson from the Egyptian case is the futility of ICTs as a
political unifier or apparatus for complete political revolution. The efficacy of said tools has not
been productive in building peaceful consensus and restoring order as evident in Egypt. ICTs
cannot stop military repression, but have actually proven to catalyze it. Again, this reflects the
idea that ICTs are tools, not a substitution for political democratization. Thus, the military
protects it power via a crackdown on the Web and in the streets that effectively eviscerates the
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little political power ICTs once possessed.
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Chapter 5, Part I: U.S. Digital Grassroots Movements
Introduction
The Internet in the United States has undergone massive changes from its inception as a
noncommercial project to its evolution into commercial use. The technological development
from email to social media revolutionized the way we communicate and interact with others. In
2012, efforts to thwart censorship legislation were successful, while later, in 2013, the Edward
Snowden revelations uncovered Orwellian surveillance tactics secretly codified by a secret court.
Two defining events in the past few years have changed the landscape of what political power
can be extracted from the Web and ICTs. First, the Occupy Movement boasted the power of the
Web to facilitate social mobilization that enacted simultaneous nationwide protest encampments
in the early Fall 2011. The Occupy movement practiced non-violent civil disobedience akin to
the memories of peaceful protestors like Gandhi and Martin Luther King Jr., by utilizing more
inclusive digital technology to activate similar-minded organizations. Yet, the NSA revelations
in spring 2013 by Snowden pushed back against this liberalizing perception of the Web. The vast
NSA surveillance dragnet counteracted and even pushed the balance of power of the Web from
the people unequivocally to the side of the state, thus severely delegitimizing the cyber-utopian
perspective of ICTs. The very technologies boasted as democratizing by the U.S. were actually
being used to track and surveil the electronic communications of subjects and citizens both
abroad and domestically. This chapter seeks to unite how these two narratives converge and why
surveillance is damning for a liberal democracy and its people’s ability to freely counteract the
status quo.

Occupy and ICTs
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Camped out in Zuccotti Park, Americans from all walks of life protested the unequal
structure of American society in the aftermath of the Great Recession for sixty days. The Occupy
movement platform emphasized the ninety-nine percent, composed of the masses, versus the one
percent, which epitomized the ultra wealthy. The platform reflected the sharp economic divide in
the nation; the top one percent held forty percent of the nation’s wealth (Fault Lines
documentary). Although they lacked a rigid list of demands, the Occupy movement—a people’s
movement— was a political protest that refused to legitimize the current political structure that
unequally favored the elite (Fault Lines documentary). Outraged by the bank bailouts and the
effects of the recession, “Occupy” acted outside of the levers of government. Instead the
movement occupied public space to reclaim the commons by stressing a radical democracy that
adheres to the people, not the power holders. Castells stresses the symbolism of seizing spaces of
places, “from where they could challenge, by their presence and their messages, the financial
spaces of flows from where global powers dominate human life” (178).
The Occupy movement used the crowdsourcing abilities of Facebook and Twitter, and
other non-proprietary social networking sites, to mobilize a mass movement. Like Egyptians that
flocked to Tahrir Square, New Yorkers and Americans used ICTs to coordinate times to occupy
parks and other public spaces for weeks and months. The movement described itself as an
inclusive, direct democracy that aimed to strike in the midst of atmosphere of political discontent
(Pew Research figures). The movement went viral and swept across the states with other Occupy
camps in Boston and Oakland. The original idea of Occupy came from a Canadian digital
magazine, Ad Busters, which circulated amongst American organizational groups in the summer
of 2011. Eventually, the date to occupy Wall Street was set for September 17th (Adbusters).
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Here, digital communications were helpful in linking similarly-minded groups, not
spontaneously creating new ones, but strengthening bonds to form a larger movement.
The Occupy movement did make use of ICTs to facilitate typical organization methods
and coordination efforts. The magazine offered digital ways to solve logistical problems e.g.,
“techies” built an open source website that arranged transportation for protestors to New York
(Ad Busters). Organization for the Occupy movement occurred online initially, which allowed
people to meet up for real-life events. Ad Busters adopted the hashtag #occupywallstreet on June
9, 2011, to begin a collective space on the web to spread awareness of the movement, both
logistical and informative (Castells, 171). The front page on Ad Busters evokes the Tahrir Square
spirit by posting different slogans like, “Stop the Monied Corruption at the Heart of our
Democracy,” which spread across social media networking sites (Ad Busters). The inclusive
nature of the Occupy movement enhanced the already established digital relationship between
activists and their organizations.
Micah White, an organizer for the Occupy movement, was inspired by the Internet and
ICTs widely as tools to coordinate global action (Esquire). White cites the internationally
coordinated February 15, 2003, protest against the impending Iraq war as a global movement
impossible before the Internet age. Despite his optimism for global coordinated action, White
believes protest will not enact immediate political change, but would help raise the collective
consciousness of the public. He favors a global coordinated shift in protest paradigm that
mobilizes social movements to change their “behaviors and depattern themselves, to actually
collectively get facts to tackle global challenges” (sic)(Esquire). Thus, White’s outlook sides
more with cyber-realists, value the Internet as a tool, but realize policy enacts political change
more so than technology, or technologically spurred protests. The ability to set the date to
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occupy Zuccotti Park online went viral, allowing many more people to see it than possible in a
pre-digital era. The Occupy movement resembles the organization process of the 2011 Egyptian
uprisings in which ICTs acted as an excellent tool to direct individuals outrage into a large,
public protest. However, the repressive state apparatus minimized the Egyptian ICTs, which
leads to the question: how effective would the grassroots ICTs be in a democratic context in the
U.S.?

Early Internet Ethos
The organizers of the Occupy movement and early adopters and creators of the Internet
share a suspicion of government power. This early Internet culture idealizes the Internet as a
great equalizer that empowers people rather than the government. John Perry Barlow’s
“Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace,” uses language that depicts the Internet as a
utopian realm in which the people rule, not the state:
We are creating a world where anyone, anywhere may express his or her beliefs, no matter how singular,
without fear of being coerced into silence or conformity. Your legal concepts of property, expression,
identity, movement, and context do not apply to us. They are based on matter, There is no matter here. You
[United States] are trying to ward off the virus of liberty by erecting guard posts at the frontiers of
Cyberspace… In our world, whatever the human mind may create can be reproduced and distributed
infinitely at no cost. The global conveyance of thought no longer requires your factories to accomplish.

This grandiose rhetoric mirrors the Occupy movement’s refusal to operate within the levers of
government to vocalize their demands. Instead, they assert these demands on the street and over
the Web. The Internet’s utopian beginnings and desire for a good place that is no place—outside
of jurisdiction of governments—is the origin of digital resistance to the commercialization and
government ownership of the Web.
The architecture of the Internet initially fueled the cyber-utopian movement. The
Internet’s design is “a loose arrangement of connected but autonomous networks of devices”
(Ryan, 31). The open and decentralized essence of the Web resembles the cyber-libertarian ideal

Kerr 74
of an un-regulated space. Moreover the actual creation of the Net by the early pioneers
emphasizes an open collaborative effort to build a “technical, open design” (Ryan citing Crocker,
32). This group of graduate students poised to build developing working protocols to connect
networks stressed a “humble and inclusive posture” epitomized by the mantra, “rough consensus
and running code… to agree on proposed standards” (Ryan, 33). The efforts of the early Internet
pioneers culminated in developing the end-to-end principle that “moved control over the
operation of the network from the connecting infrastructure to the actual devices participating in
the network themselves” (Ryan, 38). Zittrain agrees that this resulted in an Internet, “in which no
one in particular owned and that anyone could join” (30).
Similarly, in Zuccotti Park, organizers practiced non-hierarchical, horizontal
organizational structures to make decisions, including how long to stay, how to get food, and
how to counteract gender biases within the group (Fault Lines documentary). Occupy sought to
build a rough consensus amongst people from all ethnic socio-economic/political backgrounds to
aggregate the ninety-percent for a “running,” or working government for the people. Like the
Internet, Occupy practiced a decentralized organization structure to practice non-violent civil
disobedience. Ironically, the Occupy movement harnessed the liberalizing effects of ICTs to
reach the widest audience for their inclusive ideas.

The Permanency of Digital Content
The current civil society in the United States thrives because of its interconnectedness.
Facebook and Twitter are credited for easy spread-the-word campaigns. Other ICTs, like live
streaming, gained prominence as a transparent tool that could send live video feeds to people
across the country and world. The Occupy movement credits technology as a means of
coordination, as a way of learning from each other, and the ability to record everything (Fault
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Lines). Livestreams and videos uploaded to YouTube “give people a window into the
movement,” says Josh Boss, an information technology worker for Occupy (Fault Lines
documentary). Live feeds allowed Occupy to make its own coverage, while mainstream media
either did not cover some aspects of the movement or refused to cover it entirely. Yet, what
forced media to start covering the protests was when cops used repressive tactics like pepper
spray, which sparked a larger public outcry. From the Occupy position, the live feeds allow for
nothing to be hidden (Fault Lines documentary).
Despite these technologies, police in Oakland, University of California-Davis and New
York all used force to disband encampments. In the early morning of October 25th, 2011, police
surrounded the Occupy encampment under the cloak of darkness and forcibly removed protestors
(Castells, 163). Police relied on tear gas and flash grenades to vacate the premise. Over a
hundred protestors were arrested. Most importantly, a video caught the injury of an ex-Iraq war
veteran, Scott Olson, which put into public focus police brutality. Nevertheless, evictions
continued across the nation, which were covered by mainstream media. A video went viral when
a police officer pepper sprayed Occupy students at point blank range, emphasizing Castells’
point that movements are viral since captured abuse inspires mobilization (224). On November
15th, the birthplace of the Occupy movement in Zuccotti Park was similarly forcibly removed
with the same pepper spray tactics in the middle of the night.
Despite police repression and plentiful arrests of peaceful occupiers, Castells argues that
the ability of the Internet to continue the protest conversation in a cyber setting is a unique
attribute of digitally infused protest: “The Occupy Wall Street movement is a hybrid networked
movement that links cyberspace and urban space in multiple forms of communication” (177).
ICTs enable many different ways to tell the story of protests by uploading pictures and videos,
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allowing viewers and history to judge the events as they appeared through these lenses (Castells,
178). The example of the UC-Davis incident may force gradual changes to police treatment of
peaceful protestors. Although the power of these videos expose abuse and promote transparency,
they are indicative of the minimized capacity of ICTs in complicated political contexts. The
permanence of content online does little to facilitate change after the protests occur.
Now, approaching the four-year anniversary of the first encampments, the Occupy
movement has been muted by competing concerns within the U.S., namely police brutality and
state surveillance, spurred by the Snowden revelations. Although the Occupy movement lost
salience in its own name, the movement exists digitally on many autonomous blogs—like
www.occupytogether.org and occupywallst.org—by sharing links to spread Occupy news. What
the Occupy movement accomplished was a raising of consciousness that was primarily felt in the
spectacle of literally occupying public spaces. Yet, the political power of the state physically
repressed and shut down the movement. Without a public presence, the Occupy movement
disappeared from the public eye, despite its sophisticated use of technology. Yet the movement
achieved considerable success, it imprinted on the American consciousness an alternative,
although somewhat vague, to the status quo. Technology undoubtedly spurred the movement
across the nation, reaching far more supporters across a wide geographic area than previously
possible in a pre-digital era. In terms of political power, the Occupy movement successfully
organized mass demonstrations, but to no political avail. Yet, the movement, if only temporarily,
harnessed the political power of the multitude, despite its eventual collapse.

Anonymous’ ICT Power
One grassroots movement, before and after Occupy, that uses the Web as a political tool
with success is the hacktivist group Anonymous. Born from online communities interested in
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sharing jokes and memes, Anonymous emerged initially as an immature, apolitical community
that evolved into a digital counterforce to unjust practices that wields considerable cyber and
political power. The idea of Anonymous—a band of hackers without any structure or leaders—,
matured from Internet jokes to political activism while first battling the Church of Scientology in
2009. An embarrassing video of Tom Cruise excitedly talking about Scientology leaked onto the
Internet and Scientology promptly forced YouTube to take it down. In response to the
censorship, Gabriella Coleman describes a “call-to-arms” amongst 4chan.org users to employ
cyber methods to “hack” the scientology website and “take it down” (55). Users on 4chan
bounded together to use a simple form of cyber warfare—distributed-denial-of-service (DDoS)
attacks—, that generates thousands of requests for access to a website that eventually overwhelm
the site, causing it to crash and become inaccessible. An Anon (a member of Anonymous) wrote
of Anonymous’ strategy against Scientology: “Keep in mind this is a war of attrition. WE cannot
bankrupt Scientology directly—this about getting media attention, informing the pubic, wearing
down their members, pissing off their IT/phone services, counter-brainwashing their potential
recruits, and for lulz[hacker jargon for laughs]” (sic) (63). After several years of battling
Scientology, the public perception Scientology group became more negative and membership
dwindled; a success partly attributed to Anonymous’ publically waged battle that captured the
attention of the mainstream media. The key to Anonymous’ strategy is its decentralized
organization composed of many different networks (Coleman, 75). Thus the digital civil
disobedience era began by aggregating like-minded hackers to contribute to a just cause in a
remarkably decentralized manner that is difficult to trace.
Beyond Scientology, Anonymous targets companies, groups, and individuals, anyone that
threatens freedom of speech on the Internet and other liberal ideals like freedom generally.
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Anonymous is a grassroots movement like Occupy, except that it thrives behind computer
screens with its digital arsenal of hacking techniques and ability to generate digital outcries that
transform into real protests on streets. Luke Goode writes: “The ethos of Anonymous is
technophilic and digital technology is heralded not only as a way of life for group members but
also as a driving force for reshaping society” (Goode, 75). In other words, Anonymous, although
rooted in an online community, became a political force that sets an agenda, which promotes
social justice and freedom from electronic surveillance and Web censorship (Goode, 83). For
example, Anonymous recently identified thousands of Islamic State twitter handles and
submitted them to be banned by Twitter.
Scholars find Anonymous difficult to label—some say it’s a cyber-libertarian
organization while others describe it as a strain of anarchistic, “trickster politics”. What is clear,
however, is that Anonymous is a product of the Internet age. Its organization is decentralized and
composed of all different, anonymous people who share computer skills and an affinity for
activism. They view themselves as a sort of vigilante group that counters corruption, whether it
is towards corporate entities like PayPal, or states, like ISIS. Goode doubts Anonymous’ ability
to engage with policy reform since it is a subculture group with little appetite for mainstream
politics. Yet I argue that their periphery status from policymaking is what makes Anonymous
valuable for the future of a digital democracy. Hacktivism ensures anonymity and collectivity
against abuses of power; however, its proclaimed inclusivity is not as tangible or evident as
Occupy’s ability to populate parks (Goode, 84). Yet, when geared towards liberal causes and
protecting the integrity and ethos of the Internet, Anonymous elicits a sort of democratizing
“people power” from their computer skills. If there is a real example of cyber-libertarianism,
Anonymous is the best fit, yet it is hardly a widespread movement, although it is inclusive.
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Transparency
The reproducibility of electronically stored information enables users to copy and share
information cheaply and quickly. Now in the digital era often the “least trusted person” in an
organization has access to many troves of documents and only requires a USB drive to copy the
information and leak it. The wholesale disclosure of the top-secret documents as experienced in
Wikileaks exposes state abuse—like the covering up of the US airstrike in the 2007 that
mistakenly and provokingly killed Reuters news staff and ten Iraqis. Wikileaks, whose motto is
“we open governments,” posted a video of the incident, entitled “Collateral Murder,” that caused
public uproar (Sifry, 142). The ability to upload information, which anyone can access, is
radically democratizing access to information. This information puts pressure on governments to
answer to potentially hypocritical standards.
Piling information on the Web may be transparent, but it does not immediately enact
political change (Open Government). Thus, WikiLeaks is the digital age equivalent of the
Pentagon papers released by Daniel Ellsberg, except it reaches a wider audience thanks to using
the Web as a tool. What is important about this new age of transparency is the content of these
leaks. More specifically, Snowden’s leaks provide classified information about U.S. intelligence
agencies’ elaborate surveillance systems. The freedom of this information released through
journalist intermediaries challenges the American national security establishment with difficult
questions about the constitutionality of state surveillance, much like Wikileaks questioned
American rules of engagement in wars and contradictions in diplomatic cables (Sifry, 140). With
this in mind, the cumulative effect of transparency may foment political unrest and protest to
achieve the goal of transparency: “to achieve a more just society,” according to its founder,
Julian Assange (Pieterse, 1918). Thus, “WikiLeaks exposes the tensions between democratic and
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hegemonic transparency” (Pieterse, 1917). Although the NSA revelations were disclosed almost
two years ago, the state surveillance systems are still in action and have not been restrained
legislatively. Yet with the sun-setting on Section 215 of the Patriot Act on June 1, 2015, many
activists, political organizations, and journalists seek to sway public opinion to pressure
Congress to enact legislation that reforms these systems that are questionably unconstitutional,
thanks to transparency.
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Chapter 5, Part II
Digital Grassroots Power v. State Power
The power of the Occupy movement and even Anonymous is in the multitude, whereas,
the power of the state in this digital world is in the collection of data (Schneier, March 25, 2015).
Like in Egypt, these ICTs themselves did not invoke the uprisings, but they did catalyze an
already-formed group of activists and help coordinate protests. More importantly, the lasting
impact of digital technologies that capture police repression would ideally make governments
more accountable. In many ways, the power these grassroots movements gain from technological
progress is indefensible against, and not on the same level, as the progress made by omnipresent,
state electronic surveillance.

State Surveillance
In May 2013, Edward Snowden handed over top-secret information about the United
States’ intelligence services, primarily focused on the clandestine operations of the National
Security Agency (NSA). Working as a contractor for Booz Hamilton, Snowden had access to
information about how the government utilizes the Internet as a tool for collecting information
and staving off international and domestic threats. The high-degree of control over ICT data
collection exerted by the intelligence agencies and their contractors weakens the alleged
liberalizing effects of these tools. In collusion with large technology companies, and sometimes
without their knowledge, the NSA tracks and collects virtually all electronic communications in
the world. The revelations made by Snowden have reverberated around the globe and called into
question the constitutionality of the Patriot Act. First, I will outline clandestine NSA programs
that collect and store the data produced by citizens’ devices and were guided by the motto to
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“collect it all,”—“all” meaning the entirety of electronic communications both domestic and
global (Greenwald, 95).

The Programs
Before the NSA revelations, leaders of the agency often dismissed its ability to collect
telephone calls and emails—it only had such a capability for targeted foreigners, they alleged.
However, the program, “BOUNDLESS INFORMANT,” is a data log of all the telephone calls
and emails collected every day around the globe “with mathematical exactitude” (Greenwald,
30). Greenwald emphasizes that the existence of this program proves that former NSA Chief
Keith Alexander had lied to Congress when asked whether he had a quantifiable estimation of
data collected by these programs (92).
The program PRISM enabled large-scale data collection directly from the servers of the
world’s nine largest Internet companies, including: Google, Yahoo!, Microsoft, Apple, AOL,
Facebook, Skype, YouTube, and PalTalk (Greenwald, 94 and 108). In lieu of petitioning the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) court for each request of information, PRISM
empowered NSA agents to scour through companies’ information without any interaction, or
informing a company’s staff (Greenwald, 108). In 2006, Lawrence Lessig explained how
electronic communications are more susceptible to monitoring and searching because of their
“traceability” and intangibility (47). More concerning, the transition into the digital age improves
monitoring capabilities without increasing the burden on the individual search (Lessig, 23). A
user cannot tell if an NSA agent hacked into his or her email account—there is simply no trace
for the common citizen to identify. Combined with the NSA’s alliance with Internet service
providers (ISPs) and hardware companies like Apple, users’ data is vulnerable form the moment
a new phone is taken out of the box. Documents disclosed by Snowden also show the existence
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of a program, SIGNIT, which allows intelligence agencies to lobby technology companies to
build certain vulnerabilities into their design to make data collection easier (Guardian files). In
addition to the unprecedented level of access to users’ data, its digital form is conducive to
collection in a highly efficient manner that is easy to trace what a user does on the Web (Lessig,
80). Again, these collections are all encompassing and not subject to typical “probable cause”
warrants to justify each surveillance of communications. Thus, the NSA program is dubbed a
mass surveillance system.
When thinking of what the NSA actually collects, it is best to separate the data into two
categories: content and metadata. Programs like PRISM capture both forms of data. It captures
the text of emails and other electronic communications. Metadata is an especially useful form of
data that seems less intrusive since, it denotes mathematical information of a person’s
whereabouts via GPS tracking, the length of a phone call, patterns of phone calls, and the
geographic location of each side of the call. This data uncovers patterns and can help form a
narrative, which may not be true, based on the information provided. Metadata of GPS location
which comes standard in today’s iPhone’s operating system, unless disabled, provides
information of where the user is located all times, and for how long on a map. Schneier asserts
why GPS data is useful to the power of a state. In the NSA, databases named HAPPYFOOT and
FASCIA, are used to “track people’s movement, identify people who associate with people of
interests, and target drone strikes” (Schenier, 3). For instance, my phone knows when I leave the
house on which days and where I go. Proponents of the metadata surveillance argue that the
name of the user is not disclosed, thus alleviating its intrusiveness. The identity of users who are
targeted by these intangible programs is knowledge known only by law enforcement and federal
agents, they allege. In response, the indiscriminate nature of metadata allows for algorithms to
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assert that every citizen is a possible threat, without giving any reason to suspect a citizen, or all
citizens, of wrongdoing. The ability to tap into this information and maintain this information
when there is no probable cause for every individual citizen is the epitome of a mass surveillance
system gone astray and problematic to the core values of a democracy.
XKEYSCORE is the agency’s self-described “widest-reaching” system for collecting
electronic data (Greenwald, 153). Using a user’s email address, XKEYSCORE captures nearly
everything a typical user does on the Internet from the text of email, to browser history and
Google searches (Greenwald, 157). It is most effective when used in the context of social
networking sites like Facebook, which grants the agency “insight in the personal lives of targets”
(Greenwald, 158). BLARNEY is a specific program that specializes in monitoring Facebook data
and activities (Greenwald, 160). The NSA also developed a program to collect information
previously thought impossible, whilst mid-flight on a plane, enforcing the agency’s commitment
to collecting all data (Greenwald, 95).

The Vague Legality of Mass Surveillance
The rationale for legalizing invasive means to electronically track communications lies in
the enactment of the Patriot Act in the weeks following the September 11th attacks. The Patriot
Act seeks to unearth more information in order to thwart more clandestine attacks. However, the
problem was not a lack of abundant information; to the contrary, it was the insufficient sharing
of information between agency bureaus. The 9/11 Commission Report blamed the attack on the
multiple intelligence agencies’ “structural barriers” that contributed to an overall inability to
connect the dots, despite possessing information that could have prevented the attacks (408).
Regardless, in a time of crisis and panic, Section 215, amendments 501, 502, and 503, of the
Patriot Act amended the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 to enable the mass
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collection of telecommunications of U.S. citizens (Section 215 text). The first piece of
information revealed by Greenwald via Snowden to the public was the memo that forced Verizon
to allow NSA access to their communication logs of all its users, by way of Section 215.
Reauthorization of Section 215 has paved way for mass surveillance by rephrasing the text to
include users’ data, both telecommunications and Internet data.

How Data can be Controlled by Design
Lawrence Lessig bluntly stated that in this digital era, “code is law” (Lessig citing Joel
Reidenberg, 5). In the preface to his book Code 2.0, Lessig reflects how the vision of the
cyberspace was egalitarian and democratic. The as unregulated is no longer attainable, despite
the optimistic fervor of early cyber-libertarian Internet pioneers and designers. While the Internet
was being invented thanks to government-funded research, early pioneer programmers sought to
design a decentralized network that was non-proprietary. Yet the e-commerce bubble that lasted
from the mid-90s to the mid-00s revolutionized businesses and commercialized the Internet thus
eviscerating the cyber-libertarian potential of the Internet. Lessig approaches the future of the
Internet by posing it as a choice between liberty and control. However, in order avoid the
devolution of the Internet into a tool of control, the early ethos of the Internet movement needs to
be resuscitated. Lessig seeks to maintain the democratizing effects of the Internet like open and
free source, decentralization, anonymity, creative commons, and free transfer of information that
thrive from an open Internet, rather than a closed network.
What fueled the optimism for cyberspace as an egalitarian, democratic haven was its
minimalist design that intentionally reflected a political decision to disable control (Lessig, 44).
The end-to-end principle is the core principle of the Internet’s architecture that allows “a wide
range over very different functions” (44). Hence the design for the Internet was publically
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available and shared for innovative and transparent purposes (Lessig, 45). In order to accomplish
this design, it places trust in the other end to competently maintain their end of the network
(Zittrain, 31). Instead of opting for a specific use of a network that was not adaptable to other
innovative uses, the simple architecture of the Internet facilitated innovation by being open
source, meaning it allowed users to build on each other’s work to make better code and more
user-friendly program or software. For example, Mozilla Firefox is an example of an opensource browser built by thousands of different coders all driven to the same goal– to create a
non-proprietary alternative to proprietary, commercial browsers like Safari and Google Chrome.
The insistence on non-proprietary code is consistent with the ethos of the first programmers who
envisioned and created the Internet as a decentralized, non-commercial haven (Code 1.0 Lessig,
39).
Yet Lessig recognizes that cyberspace—the space in which a user engages with others on
the Internet—can be regulated by its architecture, or design (Lessig, 32). Similarly, Jonathan
Zittrain forebodingly addressed the vulnerabilities in the Internet’s architectural design in his
book The Future of the Internet and How to Stop It. Lessig would argue today’s Internet is a
closed proprietary network that creates an architecture that facilitates control (37). Thus, Lessig
warns, “cyberspace, left to itself, will not fulfill the promise of freedom. Left to itself, cyberspace
will become a perfect tool of control” (Lessig, 4). Lessig explains that the trajectory towards
cyberspace being regulated is driven by “purely pragmatic commercial ends…not the product of
some 1984-inspired conspiracy (38). Although that may be true—that the Internet’s promising
egalitarianism is sufficiently tarnished by the commercialization of the web, Lessig refrains from
describing this shift as nefarious. But now, in the context of intelligence agencies exploiting the
ICTs as means of control, Lessig’s work is eerily foreboding. The manipulation of the Internet’s
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original architecture creates a system of near perfect control, which not only constrains the
aspirations of the early programmer movement, but also impacts the political efficacy ICT users.

Excessive State Control
In the light of Snowden’s revelations, Lessig’s cautionary tale bore fruit: the NSA had
manipulated the architecture of the Web as well as corrupted the privacy agreements of
technology firms and Internet Service Providers (ISPs). Lessig writes how the government
applies pressure to companies to “build their systems to collect and preserve a kind of data that
only aids the government” (Lessig, 65). PRISM is the program that not only directs how
companies log their data, but also requires an NSA access point. In the scope of this thesis it is
important to address this concept of collecting one’s information stored for example on Gmail
when Google allows NSA backdoor access to its users’ communications. “Data collection is the
dominant activity of commercial websites” according to Lessig (219). However, this statement
becomes complicated once it is realized that the government taps into the data collection of
technology companies and fiber optic cables. The same can be said for the iPhone and other
major Internet companies that collude with the government’s mass surveillance system.
Lessig and Zittrain illustrate a creation story of the Internet as designed to be open and
emphasize its motive “had little concern for controlling the network or its users’ behavior”
(Zittrain, 28). This vision starkly contrasts with the current state of control of the Internet.
Zittrain notes how the commercialization of the Internet created new media kings like Facebook
and Google, which filled the vacuum of traditional old media and monetized the Web. The
values of free speech and instantaneous communication that pervaded the early Web movement
were compromised for control. The NSA’s operations manipulate the Internet’s architecture and
attempt to centralize all its communications in a vast decentralized network to fulfill its
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organizational motto—“collect it all,” since digital information is traceable. Thus, the NSA’s
ability to collect information relies on who controls the endpoints of users’ information—ISPs
and technology companies, which are under the burden of Section 215 to provide all data to the
NSA.

Data is Control
The intense prioritization of capturing data reveals the power of the Internet as a data
pool of users conducive to digital extraction. More importantly, the NSA’s focus on electronic
communications suggests its concern for the political efficacy the communication revolution
brings with the Internet. Hence, these government agencies seek to collect all electronic
transmissions in order to control any perceived threats, no matter how hypocritical such behavior
is in a democracy. Political activity in and of itself is suspicious for instance, the NSA surveilled
an anti-war march in Akron, Ohio in 2006 (Greenwald, 185). Additionally, mass surveillance has
tracked domestic environmental groups as well (Lessig, 210).
To corroborate this threatening feeling, Barton Gellman and Julie Tate found that
“ordinary Internet users, American and non-American alike, far outnumber legally targeted
foreigners in the communications intercepted by the National Security Agency” (Coleman, 379).
In other words, these dragnet systems are justified by a threat from abroad, but are actually used
on the general American public. According to Castells, he proclaims,
Mass self-communication provides the technological platform for the construction of the autonomy of the
social actor, be it individual or collective, vis-à-vis the institutions of society. This is why governments are
afraid of the Internet, and this is why corporations have a love-hate relationship with it and are trying to
extract profits while limiting its potential for freedom (7).

Perhaps governments were once afraid of the Internet, but after Snowden’s revelations it is
clear—government agencies thrive off data collected legally and illegally via digital tools that
make mass surveillance feasible. As a result, the online social networks that take place in the
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“free space of the Internet” are susceptible to the fear of being overheard by government
agencies. Thus, the movement from outrage to hope is detoured back to fear by state repression
in the streets by vacating Occupy camps and online by intimidating users by evoking a big
brother figure that equates dissent with wrongdoing.
Lastly, Castells emphasizes the autonomy of the Internet, as though the Web’s nature is
innately decentralized, allowing for “mobilizing, organizing, deliberating, coordinating and
deciding,” as well as operating a leaderless movements (as evident in Anonymous) (Castells,
229). Although that may have been true in the early ethos of the Internet movement that created
the Internet from “the culture of freedom,” today’s Internet is compromised by the state’s
surveillance powers. Again, like Lessig, Bruce Schneier states that the nature of the Internet
today is highly centralized and thus conducive to collection. However, Castells argues that social
networking sites (SNS) enable the self-presentation of a real person connecting to real persons
that enables the transition from fear to hope and hope to political change (Castells, 231). This
statement has been proven wrong in states without a democratic tradition like Egypt and China,
in which identified users of blogs or videos have been imprisoned and/or killed.

The “Nothing-to-Hide” Fallacy
In the wake of 9/11, government officials often argue that encroaching on civil liberties is
the price to pay for safety. Proponents of mass surveillance rely on the mantra that, “If you’re not
doing anything wrong, you have nothing to hide”. However, once the government defines what is
“wrong,” there is a slippery slope for what constitutes wrongdoing. Labeling thoughts or actions
as “wrong” simply because they are contrary to the status quo is antithetical to the integrity of a
liberal democracy committed to free speech and liberty. When placed in the context of the
terrorist threat shortly after 9/11, this argument becomes more tricky, but not necessarily defunct.
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Proponents quip, “do you object to TSA searches, simply because they make sure you do have
nothing to hide?” In reply, a TSA search is directly tied to a favorable end—to freely travel. It is
expected that security measures are enforced prior to boarding a flight as a one-time recurring
event. The same is not to be said with the constant search and seizure of all electronic
communications. This is not to say that all surveillance is intruding on one’s civil liberties, but
massive surveillance without warrants or probable cause clearly violates all citizens’ civil
liberties.
But, why should I care, if I am kept safe, is often the reply to concerns over mass
surveillance. First, submitting to this state practice is voluntarily diluting one’s constitutional
rights, most specifically, one’s Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable search and
seizures. By signing off this right without any notice of expiration, it no longer exists and
citizens individually and as a whole lose some of their collective political power and right to
privacy against a tyrannical government. In the Western perspective, from the Victorian era to
the present day, privacy as a concept has evolved immensely into three categories: solitude,
secrecy, and anonymity (Miller, 114). The segmentation of homes into rooms separated people
and established solitude—the ability to be alone (Miller, 113). In addition to solitude, the
concept of privacy emphasizes secrecy or the control of a certain, and sometimes, sensitive
information that the world can know about oneself. Privacy tends to be an admission of guilt in
today’s society; however, users’ actions often contradict their “nothing-to-hide” rationale. Glenn
Greenwald asks—then what prompts users to use passwords on their email and social media
accounts? Greenwald reasons that if users truly had nothing to hide, they would not practice
privacy controls. Hence, privacy is not nefarious, but relational like (Greenwald citing Gellman).
The conversation you have with your friends is not always the same one you want your parents
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to hear, and vice versa. Finally, the right to privacy resonates with the right to anonymity or a
protection from unwanted scrutiny (Miller, 2011, ). On the surface, the Internet seemed to be
compatible and protective of these three attributes of solitude, secrecy, and anonymity; however,
the traceability and reproducibility of information is instantaneous and cheap. Moreover, the
information shared on the Web willingly, like social media, along with information stored or
communicated on the Web, under the presumption of privacy, are all equally susceptible to mass
surveillance.
Undoubtedly the Constitution faces interpretational challenges in the digital era. The
dragnet collection of all citizens’ electronic communications indiscriminately is constitutionally
unsound. A dragnet means all data is collected, sorted, and stored. The reauthorization of Section
215 makes it clear that “data” are included as tangible things susceptible to this dragnet. Again,
the fact that this searching is indiscriminate is more troubling than individualized targeting,
because every citizen is then suspicious of illegal activity. Everyone is a suspect, since the few
(the NSA) watch (track) the many (the world). This sort of blanket targeting encourages a
compliant mode of thinking throughout the citizenry.

State Surveillance as a Panopticon
The idea of the panopticon can be traced back to a prison design theorized by Jeremy
Bentham in the eighteenth century (Lyon, 655). The panopticon prison layout placed a guard
tower in the middle of a circular prison, ensuring a three-hundred-sixty degree view. The guard
tower could see into all of the inmates’ cells, but the prisoners could not tell if the guards were
actively watching them. This psychological experiment sought to instill a fear of being watched
to produce a more compliant prisoner who was more apt to engage in correct behavior since he
or she was possibly being watched. The design creates an illusion of an omnipresent force and
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was installed as an alternative to traditional prison layouts in which it was difficult to maintain
order and prisoner compliance. Yet the idea of the panopticon is most widely known by Michel
Foucault’s treatment of the panopticon in the context of institutional surveillance (Greenwald,
176). Now the idea of a panopticon is possible with the advent of traceable electronic data.
Whoever carries a phone thus carries a personal GPS locator.
The NSA’s deluge of surveillance programs creates a panopticon in the everyday lives of
citizens connected to electronic devices. Whether on one’s phone or laptop, the knowledge that
what they enter into these devices may be spied upon changes one’s behavior. According to
research conducted in this post-Snowden atmosphere, thirty-four percent of Americans familiar
with the revelations have taken steps to shield their information from the government (Pew
Internet). The revelations that the government can track what you search have made citizens
more compliant by not searching certain information. Some twenty-six percent of people who
have heard a “lot” about surveillance use social media less often and change their social media
privacy settings (Pew Internet). Some sixty-one percent of Americans, “say they have become
less confident the surveillance efforts are serving the public interest” (Pew Internet).
Furthermore, fifty-four percent of Americans believe it is unacceptable to monitor Americans
under this dragnet approach (Pew Research Center). These revelations also contributed to feeling
less confident in the security of common communication channels like social media that they
suspect are heavily monitored by the government (Pew Research Center). Eighty-one percent
feel “not very” or “not at all secure” when using social media sites to share personal information
(Pew Research Center). This trend bodes ill for the future of dissent in America, when
organizing and coordinating protests over digital devices are unprotected knowledge and may
detract citizens from engaging in behavior that is not illegal, but frowned upon by government
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agencies. Moreover, this trend of self-censorship is the ultimate victory of a panopticon that
seeks to instill fear to ultimately citizens’ behavior and make them compliant, obedient and
conforming to state expectations (Greenwald, 175).

Conclusion
The uninhibited control of the Internet by American intelligence agencies directly
contradicts the values of a democratic government. Despite the security justifications for such
intrusive surveillance programs, an independent report found that the mass collection of phone
metadata, codified by Section 215, had not stopped any terrorist attacks or plots (9/11
Commission Report: Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board). The framework for massive
surveillance touches every facet of a citizen’s life in the twenty-first century, when life and work
take place largely online. With the effects of a panopticon already instilling fear and compliance
in the U.S. citizenry, efforts must be made to restructure, if not completely dissolve, the
ineffective surveillance state. Although it may be impossible to “reset the Net,” technology
companies are changing their practices to meet the public’s demands for stricter privacy in the
post-Snowden era. As a result, companies like Apple are making encryption standard on their
devices, much to the dismay of law enforcement and intelligence agencies (Nakashima and
Gellman). Snowden’s revelations uncover that the Internet has been coopted into a perfect tool of
control for American intelligence agencies with dangerous implications for the vibrancy of a
democracy in which every aspect of life can be and is digitized. Although political life is not as
restricted as in China, the policies and techniques used by American intelligence agencies are
remarkably similar to their China counterparts. Both presume that political activity threatens the
prevailing order and issue blanket surveillance to protect their power. Both promote a political
atmosphere of compliance with their direct and indirect means of surveillance that encourages
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self-censoring behavior. Both enjoy high levels of stability that reduce the political efficacy of
dissent via digital technologies.
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Chapter 6: Conclusion
Despite the varied use of ICTs in these four case studies, a striking common unifier is
present: ICTs are manipulated and designed as a tool of control by the state to protect its political
power. The hidden form of technology that is conducive to control is the data produced by ICTs.
This data tells a lot about a user; it tracks what a person communicates and thinks and where he,
or she goes. Thus ICTs enable the CCP to practice censorship and surveillance techniques as
grounds for detainment, or suspicionless surveillance to reinforce their power and legitimacy.
The ingenuity of this approach is that ICTs perceive a wave of democratization that is not
completely accurate, but rather illusionary. In China, dissent opinions are corrected and
repressive tactics are employed once there is a concerted effort to disrupt the power of the Party.
During the Arab Spring, the promise of ICTs as democratizing forces sputtered after continued
military repression throughout political instability. Egypt’s chaotic order continues to repress its
people and several hundreds of protesters were killed in the latest uprisings in 2013. Thus, in
China and Egypt the censorship and surveillance of ICTs is reinforced by physical repression.
Hence the liberalizing effects of the Web are controlled in China as a façade of democracy. In
Egypt, ICTs cannot solve the political problem of political fragmentation, and may in fact ignite
further conflict. Additionally, the U.S. control of ICT data raises the question of whether, or not
such mediums of communication are given the same democratic rights as non-digital speech.

Are ICTs a force of democratization?
There are considerable liberalizing effects from ICTs in each of the case studies;
information is shared quickly and easily. Yet what these studies also prove is that ICTs do not
generate political power from below, or from sources other than the state. In other words, the
cyber-utopian mixture of ICTs and existent alternative political spheres has had little effective
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political change. The widespread use of ICTs by citizens makes it an attractive medium through
which political discourse can flow; yet in China and Egypt, collective movements disintegrate
thanks to state technological repression, and in other cases, physical repression. The Arab Spring
in Egypt successfully disposed a tyrant, but the ICTs and the remaining political groups could
not solve the political problems of unifying Egypt under a rule that was not dictatorial and
established. While in the U.S. the political atmosphere is democratic, so the focus of ICTs in this
context should reinforce democratizing power. Yet political change via grassroots mobilizations
is sparse and ineffective when demonstrated. While the mass surveillance state erected to capture
and find terrorists detracts from liberty of citizens, these dragnet systems still pervade all
electronic communications.
The sole objection to the weak power ICTs generate is the emergence of the hacktivist as
an outlying actor between a citizen and state. Members of Anonymous possess highly
sophisticated use of ICTs that parallels, and may even surpass, some states’ use of these tools.
However, the promise thought to be embedded in ICTs was that everyone could use them to
bring about political change and democratize the world one wired authoritarian regime at a time.
Instead, the common citizen uses ICTs for communication and coordination. Non-violent protest
and dissent may be amplified, but muster little political change. Whereas, Anonymous’ use of
sophisticated ICT weapons, like DDoS attacks, allows it to initiate public outcry, and sometimes,
political change, yet outside the levers of government.
The biggest lesson to take from this thesis is how the unveiling of a mass domestic
surveillance system flips the original question of this thesis of whether ICTs are forces of
democratization. Instead, ICTs are forces of control, which infringe on citizens’ liberties to
varying extents, depending on the political context. The case studies focusing on China and
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Egypt demonstrate the effectiveness of ICT collection in preserving political power and staving
off potential threats to that power, whether it manifests digitally or on the streets. Additionally,
the repression associated with activists—both digital and on the streets—encourages apolitical
behavior in both mediums. Whereas, ISIS uses ICTs like videos and spam tweeting as a
Spinternet that builds the creation narrative of the fledgling state as to evoke fear regionally and
globally and gain political power. It is to be expected that non-democratic actors seek
preservation of power because they hold power mandate, but rule and keep order via some sort
of force. However, even democratic nations —U.S., Canada, U.K., Australia, and New
Zealand—engage in mass surveillance because it is the most pervasive form of control to protect
power.
This assimilation between democratic and non-democratic regimes in terms of using
ICTs as forces of control is concerning but is also steeped in the reality of data byproducts
emitted by ICTs. The digitization of culture and politics fulfills the ICTs’ potential as an
unprecedented tool of control via the allure of technology. The wide-scale adoption of ICTs like
smart phones inevitably produce sensitive, personal data, which are the center of state ICT
control although they such information appears non-threatening. Simply put, we do not
understand, or foresee, how the data we willingly relinquish can be used to control us. With the
convenience of digital age, there is an encroachment on one’s privacy and autonomy. Lessig
accurately theorized that the commercialization of the Internet was the definitive act towards
making the Internet more closed. Today, technologies are equipped with GPS tracking, sensors
and Wi-Fi that produce sensitive data on one’s whereabouts, heart rate, communications, etc.
This knowledge, if privy to companies and intelligence agencies, greatly facilitates the
construction of a mass surveillance system. The NSA revelations undoubtedly contribute to
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making this argument not only relevant, but also chillingly real. In the wake of the Snowden
revelations, U.S. technology companies are facing a challenge in foreign markets in which they
are perceived as collusive with the government (Hakim). This development inverts Lessig's
original thinking that commerce designs a Net that is conducive to control; rather governments
promote ICTs as a form of control (Lessig, 37).
Now technology companies are implementing more protective measures of their clients’
data. In their latest operating system update, Apple now encrypts all its iMessages (Apple). This
idea is evident in chapter three when Robert Hannigan argues that technology companies abet
terrorism by allowing such organizations, like ISIS, to enjoy the connectivity of the Web without
being tracked. Hannigan seems to be saying two demands: take ISIS off Twitter and stop
creating encryption to make data impenetrable. As stated in chapter three, ICTs like Twitter, are
tools that have the potential to be exploited, which is a cost of ensuring an open society and Web.
Secondly, Hannigan’s argument for weaker encryption disregards the ethical concerns of mass
surveillance. Instead Hannigan favors the extension of the dragnet in order stop terrorist attacks
without considering the ineffectiveness of mass surveillance, especially when compared to
traditional law enforcement and targeted surveillance methods. These are the types of problems
that characterize the title of this thesis, as “Power Tangled in the Web;” how the growing
concern over what happens with one’s data is belittled by the state and commerce.

Why this Matters
What ultimately eviscerates social media networking sites and ICTs’ potential generally
is how what they post or tweet is conducive to collection and control. Perceiving ICTs as a
collection vacuum effectively de-incentivizes users from communicating pertinent or political
information over the web. This act of self-censorship and digital reclusion is becoming evident in
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research. Pew Research Center found in August 2014 that social media does not provide an
alternative, vibrant sphere for political talk when focusing on the Snowden revelations: “People
reported being less willing to discuss the Snowden-NSA story in social media than they were in
person—and social media did not provide an alternative outlet for those reluctant to discuss the
issues in person” (Pew Research Center). No longer is the hidden control of ICTs ambiguous; the
digitization of everything enables control and changes the way we perceive technology. If users
of social networking sites are hesitant to engage in political discussion on Facebook, how can
ICTs invoke political change? Thus, power is tangled in the Web; citizens are hesitant to
contribute on ICTs that leave their data vulnerable, and states engaged in mass surveillance rely
on the continued stream of data by compliant, uninformed or lazy users. The convenience of
ICTs and their firm embedment in culture demands a solution to the unnecessary and antiliberalizing effects of a mass surveillance system. In the political context of the U.S. mass
surveillance state the use of ICTs is paradoxically antithetical to liberty.
Although political change may be more accessible within the levers of government in the
U.S., the use of ICTs as a vehicle for political change is unfounded in all four studies. Instead,
each study revealed how ICTs are a revolutionizing form of control, when a state can mitigate
the inevitable liberalizing effects. China’s masterful use of the Web brings about positive
changes in terms of increased responsiveness to its citizens about local corruption and
environment problems. Yet the control of ICTs ensures that any significant political challenges
will be identified and suppressed before gaining traction. ISIS seeks to control how the world
perceives it as a legitimate state. In a matter of time, ISIS will be able to employ sophisticated
ICT censorship and surveillance to further incubate its power, like China, Egypt and the U.S.
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Egypt and the U.S. both use ICTs to control political grassroots movements and respond in ways
to suppress the power of ICTs, indirectly in the U.S. study and directly in the Egyptian case.
Like Lessig feared, ICTs have been left to themselves, or rather, left to the discretion of
the state and became the most invasive tool of control yet. Apart from traditional surveillance,
digital surveillance can know your most private details of what you are thinking, based off your
data byproducts. With this power is confined to those in political power, ICTs effectively
suppress liberty rather than promoting it. Until more safeguards are implemented to protect
against the manipulation of ICTs, the perception of liberalizing ICT power, from the citizen
perspective, will ultimately favor whoever controls all the data: states and technology companies.
In this regard, political power in the Web is not tangled; it is clearly in the interest of the state.
Whereas, citizen power via ICTs is tangled; if one uses these technologies they submit to a
pervasive, inescapable system of control. If they opt out of ICTs, they cannot function in the dayto-day demands of life in the twenty-first century. This is evident in the failure of digital mass
mobilizations, like the 2011 Egypt uprisings and the Occupy movement, to produce actual
political change with the help of ICTs, but is ultimately restrained by physical and digital
repression. Yet technology is the result of human processes. Thus, if users can initiate different
policies to ensure that ICT tracking is not the de facto setting in non-democratic and democratic
regimes alike, then perhaps “liberation technology” will prosper. Until then, ICTs act more like
“suppression technology” to varying degrees, although each case study demonstrates how each
example of state ICT control are all uniformly chilling to liberty.
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